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Abstract of Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
COMPETITION’S EFFECT ON TEACHER PAY AND TEACHER 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
This dissertation adds to the literature that examines the effect of competition and 
school choice reform in elementary and secondary education.  Specifically, we explore 
how three major forms of competition in U.S. schooling markets in Tiebout competition, 
charter competition, and private school competition affect the teaching profession by 
estimating a teacher wage equation and series of teacher characteristic equations.    Since 
it has been well-established that all 3 forms of competition are likely endogenous, we 
present 2SLS estimates of competition’s effect in addition to simple OLS estimates.  Our 
findings confirm the importance of studies controlling for endogeneity concerns, 
particularly in regards to teacher earnings.  In nearly all instances, OLS yields estimates 
of the effects of competition on wages that are biased toward zero for each of the three 
measures. 
 
Additional findings suggest that policies aimed at promoting competition and 
choice-based reforms might well benefit traditional public school (TPS) teachers through 
higher pay, while competition would likely have little significant effect on earnings for 
charter teachers.  In particular, we find TPS teachers working in MSAs with the average 
Tiebout competition receive a pay boost of almost 16.8%, while a 10-percent increase in 
charter competition corresponds to a nearly 20% rise in teacher pay for TPS teachers.  
While competition might benefit teachers through higher pay, it is unclear as to whether 
competition would change the type of teachers schools attract.  Few systematic results 
emerge when exploring teacher characteristics.  Some of the more interesting results 
include Tiebout competition raising the prevalence of TPS teachers having a Bachelor’s 
in math, and charter competition reducing the incidence of state certification and 
unionization among TPS teachers.  Finally, although competition appears to have few 
significant effects on charter teachers, substantial differences in pay and characteristics 
among charter teachers and TPS teachers exist.  We document these differences. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decade or more, school accountability legislation like No Child Left 
Behind, and its spinoff, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, has spurred on 
nearly every state and hundreds of districts throughout the 50 U.S. states to experiment 
with education reforms aimed at improving school quality.  Particularly popular have 
been those reforms that seek to make the market for elementary and secondary education 
more competitive by giving parents more control over their children’s education.  These 
reforms are often referred to as school choice programs.  Examples include school 
voucher programs in which students in underperforming schools are given a voucher to 
attend private schools, inter-district choice programs in which students, at no cost, can 
attend schools outside their own district in an effort to better meet the individual student’s 
educational needs, and charter schools, which are public schools that provide a free, 
performance-based alternative to traditional public schools and private schools.   
The central argument behind school choice programs and other competition-based 
reforms is that competition creates market-like incentives which force inefficient schools 
to improve school quality or be forced to close.  This has led researchers to produce a 
considerable volume of literature on the potential effectiveness of competition in 
improving school quality, often measured by outcomes such as the test score performance 
of students, student retention and dropout, and post-school wages.  However, relatively 
few studies look at competition’s effect on what is one of the most important inputs in 
determining these outcomes—teachers.  This paper seeks to fill this void by 
systematically analyzing the effect of various forms of competition on the organization of 
teaching jobs in public schools.  Specifically, we examine the effect of Tiebout 
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competition, charter competition, and private school competition on the wages paid to 
teachers, as well as on the particular characteristics, skills, and attributes that teachers 
accumulate.  We further analyze the effect of competition by exploring whether 
competition has different effects on teachers according to the school-setting in which 
teachers work, charter school or traditional public school (TPS).  Finally, this paper 
provides evidence on differences in pay and characteristics among teachers working in 
public schools with varying incentive structures and organizational goals by comparing 
pay and characteristics of teachers working in charter schools to teachers working in 
TPSs. 
Finding presented in this dissertation are largely consistent with other studies 
exploring competition’s effect on the teaching profession, particularly in regards to pay.1  
We find that failing to eliminate endogeneity concerns often discussed in the literature 
lead to substantially biased OLS estimates.  Therefore, we employ a 2SLS regression 
methodology to identify the impacts of Tiebout competition, charter competition, and 
private school competition.  Our findings suggest competition to be associated with 
higher teacher pay, especially for TPS teachers.  TPS teachers working in MSAs with the 
average amount of Tiebout competition see pay rise by a shade below 17%, while a ten-
percent rise in the MSA charter enrollment share corresponds to roughly a 19.5% 
increase in wages.  Additionally, Tiebout competition and charter competition appear to 
have little significant effect in regards to pay for charter teachers, and private school 
competition does not have a statistical impact on earnings for either TPS teachers or 
charter teachers.  Finally, few systematic effects of competition on teacher characteristics 
exist.  Some of the more interesting results of competition’s effect on characteristics 
1 Hoxby (2002), Taylor (2010), and Jackson (2011) all find competition leads to higher pay. 
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include charter competition reducing the probability of unionization and state 
certification among TPS teachers, and Tiebout competition raising the prevalence of TPS 
teachers having a degree in Math. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 begins by reviewing 
the literature on teacher pay in U.S. public schools, followed by an examination of some 
of the more popular education reforms, and closes with a discussion of the effect of these 
education reforms on student achievement and teacher pay.  Chapter 3 outlines the 
empirical strategy used to identify the effect of competition.  Chapter 4 describes the 
data.  Chapter 5 presents wage equation results, while Chapter 6 discusses characteristic 
equation results.  Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes. 
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2 Literature 
2.1  Teacher Pay in Traditional Public Schools 
 Changes in the way traditional public schools (TPSs) have compensated teachers 
have been few and far between.  In fact, from the 1800’s through more modern times, 
only three models of pay have pre-dominantly been used by schools and school district to 
compensate teachers.2  These include the initial room and board model of pay, followed 
by a grade-based compensation system, and finally a change to the current single salary 
schedule.  This chapter reviews the history of pay in U.S. public schools, beginning in the 
1800’s and continuing on through current pay schemes. 
2.1.1 Room and Board Compensation 
 For most of the 1800’s, public education in the U.S. was provided in a one-room 
schoolhouse setting.  This largely reflected the fact that the majority of Americans lived 
in rural areas, and over half of all U.S. workers were farm workers (Prostik, 1995).  
Schools thus established policies that reflected the needs of a largely agricultural-based 
society, which often included child labor in crop production.  Because child labor was 
vital to crop production, few children attended school all year and rural schools typically 
had a fewer number of school days than did city schools.  Additionally, the school year 
was divided into two or more shortened sessions, often a winter and summer term, to 
facilitate crop production. 
Teaching in the 1800’s was generally not viewed as a profession and few 
individuals made a career out of teaching.  Instead, teaching served as a supplementary 
income source to farming for men, while it served as a transition into marriage for 
2 Other pay systems have been tried, such as career ladders, but none have received widespread acceptance 
and use.  This chapter reviews those pay models that are common to most TPSs.   
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women (Odden, 1995).    In addition, few professional standards existed.  Teachers often 
had little more than an elementary education and lacked formal training in educational 
methods.  Teacher qualifications instead focused on basic knowledge of reading, writing, 
and arithmetic, and communities placed a high value on teachers possessing a sound 
moral character and middle-class appearance (Prostik, 1995).  Finally, teachers were by-
and-large local to the community in which they taught. 
Out of this environment came the room and board model of pay.  Although 
teachers received a small weekly stipend, the main component of a teacher’s 
compensation was room and board in the homes of their students on a week-to-week, 
rotating basis.  This model fit well with the nature of education in the 1800’s.  In 
particular, it allowed communities to directly monitor teachers to ensure they were of 
high moral character, which was considered to be of primary importance, and, in the 
absence of professional standards, the ability to closely monitor its teachers allowed 
communities to hold teachers accountable for performance. 
Despite its advantages, the room and board model of teacher pay created 
considerable instability within the teaching ranks.  While teaching often lost women 
teachers to marriage, men could usually find better paying job opportunities outside 
teaching.  Additionally, moving from home–to-home on a weekly basis tended to be quite 
cumbersome, and many individuals, particularly men, sought alternative job opportunities 
because of the amount of scrutiny placed on the personal life of teachers. Ultimately, 
room and board pay faded as changes in the U.S. economy brought about changes in the 
educational landscape. 
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2.1.2 Grade-Based Pay  
 In the late 1800's and early 1900's, America began transitioning from an 
agricultural-based society to a more urban and industrialized nation as a result of the 
industrial revolution.  This movement drastically changed the way education was 
perceived as the demand for more skilled and educated workers intensified with the new 
industrial-based economy.  In addition, as states began outlawing child labor in factories 
and the farming industry declined, more and more children became attending school on a 
regular basis and for longer and more sustained periods of time. 
 With the changing economy came significant school reform.  In particular, the 
one-room schoolhouse of the early 1800’s diminished in favor of grade-based schools, 
separated by age and ability, as thousands of independent rural schools merged to form 
large public school districts under the ideology that larger state school systems with a 
common governance would produce more efficient schools (Prostik, 1995).  States also 
began to raise requirements for becoming a teacher as laws were enacted requiring 
teachers to have more formal education and become certified to teach.  These new 
standards led to a dramatic increase in the cost of entering teaching.  In addition, white 
males typically filled higher-paying administrative positions created by these newly 
formed school systems, or exited the teaching profession altogether as they could earn a 
higher alternative wage outside teaching.  As a consequence, the teaching ranks consisted 
mostly of women and minority teachers. 
 The establishment of grade-based schools, along with the prohibitively high cost 
of entering teaching, led to drastic changes in teacher pay.  Many states began 
establishing minimum salary levels to reduce high turnover rates, and salary schedules 
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became commonplace in large, urban cities.  Ultimately emerging was a grade-based 
model of teacher compensation, which paid teachers a cash salary according to grade-
level taught.  Secondary grade teachers typically received higher pay compared to their 
elementary grade counterparts under this model, which partly reflected the notion that 
elementary grade students were easier to educate than secondary grade students, but also 
reflected the higher alternative wage secondary grade teachers could earn outside 
teaching and the higher costs associated with obtaining more years of formal classroom 
education.  Finally, largely as a by-product of societal norms, women and minority 
teachers received wages far below that of their white male counterpart (Prostik, 1995, 
Odden 1995). 
Grade-based models of teacher pay were successful in helping contribute to the 
professionalization of teaching by requiring teachers to acquire more formal education, 
mandating teachers earn a teaching certificate or teachers’ license, and equalizing teacher 
pay across schools by grade-level taught within cities.  However, women and minority 
teachers typically received pay below that of white male teachers, and elementary grade 
teachers were paid less compared to secondary grade teachers.  Moreover, higher-paying 
administrative positions in schools and school districts were generally reserved for white 
males.  Differences in pay, particularly among women and minorities, ultimately led to a 
call for equal pay for work in public schools. 
2.1.3 The Single Salary Schedule 
In the early 1900’s, teachers’ organizations began advocating for equal pay 
practices in TPSs.  Major contributors to this movement were teachers’ organizations 
such as the Chicago Teachers’ Federation (CTF), which lobbied the city of Chicago on 
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behalf of female teachers for more equitable teacher salaries and better working 
conditions, and the Interborough Association of Women Teachers (LAWT), which 
successfully lobbied the state of New York for legislation requiring all teachers receive 
equal pay for equal work (Prostik, 1995). 
The push by teachers’ organizations to eliminate inequalities in teacher pay 
ultimately led schools to adopt the single salary schedule.  First introduced in Des 
Moines, Iowa and Denver, Colorado in the 1920’s, the single salary schedule used two 
lone criteria, years of teaching experience and education attainment, to determine the 
annual base salary of teachers.  Though total compensation sometimes varied, if, for 
instance, extra pay was awarded for overseeing an extracurricular activity or teaching 
summer school, teachers working in the same school district generally received equal pay 
according to a formula set forth by their district’s single salary schedule and determined 
by their experience/education combination.  By 1950, some form of the single salary 
schedule was in use in approximately 97% of all public schools (Prostik 1995), and the 
single salary schedule has continued to be the dominant method of pay more than 90 
years after first being introduced.3 
The single salary schedule revolutionized compensation policies in public 
schools.  For the first time, factors such as age, race, gender, grade-level, nor subjective 
assessment played a role in the way schools compensated teachers.  Schools instead 
began using objective criteria, largely experience and education, to set pay.  Despite 
succeeding in eliminating discriminatory pay practices, the single salary schedule has 
been subject to several sharp criticisms over the years however.  Perhaps most prominent 
3 According to Podgursky and Springer (2007), about 95% of all public schools still use single salary 
schedule. 
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being equal pay for teachers despite unequal performance, ability, and skill among 
teachers.  Additionally, experience and education, the primary determinants of teacher 
compensation, have been found to have little or no correlation with the academic 
performance of students (Hanushek, 2003, Lavy, 2009).  Finally, U.S. students have 
continually been outperformed by international students on achievement exams in math 
and science, leading to growing concern over the quality of public schools.  Not 
surprisingly, teachers often receive the lion’s share of blame for poor student outcomes, 
especially since the current salary structure does not provide TPSs the flexibility to adjust 
pay to compete with other, often more lucrative, professions for high ability teachers.  
Indeed, Hoxby and Leigh (2004) find greater pay opportunities outside teaching, and, in 
particular, reduced earnings potential within teaching have led high ability women to 
migrate out of teaching since 1960.  These types of concerns have led schools to try a 
variety of education reforms.  Some reforms attempt to make teacher pay more 
professionally competitive, while other reforms attempt to make the education 
marketplace more competitive.  All reforms are intended to improve school quality. 
2.2 Teacher Incentive Programs 
Some of the most popular reforms in education have been those that institute 
some type of incentive pay, with a common theme being to tie teacher pay to the 
academic performance of students.  These reforms, commonly referred to as teacher 
incentive programs, are designed to more directly link pay to performance, with the idea 
being to reward better teachers for better performance.  Teachers, or groups of teachers, 
meeting the performance target receive bonus pay in addition to their predetermined 
academic year base salary.  Those failing to trigger the performance incentive generally 
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only receive their annual base salary.  Teacher incentive programs thus differ from 
traditional pay schemes, like the single salary schedule, by rewarding teachers with 
higher pay for superior classroom performance. 
 Teacher incentive programs have long been suggested as a way for schools to 
enhance quality.4  Proponents often contend benefits occur primarily in one of the 
following ways.  First, and most commonly argued, is that the opportunity to receive 
higher pay motivates existing teachers to supply more effort to the classroom.  The 
second is that higher earnings opportunities attracts higher quality teachers to the 
profession since teachers would be able to earn relatively more under teacher incentive 
programs than they otherwise would have been able to under uniform pay schemes like 
the single salary schedule.  Finally, low quality teachers may be forced out of teaching 
altogether if they are unable to meet minimum performance standards, and, as a result, 
are subject to reprimands such as being let go from teaching or a reduction in pay for 
poor performance.  Therefore, supporters of teacher incentive pay programs believe that 
the net effect of such programs would be an increase in overall school quality, either 
through an increase in effort on the part of existing teachers or increases in the underlying 
quality of teachers in schools.   
 Teacher performance and school quality in general is commonly measured by the 
test score performance of students, although it is sometimes measured by an alternative 
outcome, such as graduation rates or GPA.  In addition, a variety of teacher incentive 
programs have been tried, including individual incentive programs, rank-order 
tournaments, group incentives, and school-wide incentives.  Studies evaluating the 
4 For example, a highly critical report on the state of public schools, A Nation at Risk (1983), recommended 
teacher performance incentives to reform the single salary schedule. 
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effectiveness of teacher incentive programs have used a number of different econometric 
methods, and several studies find a positive relationship between incentive programs and 
school quality. 
 Figlio and Kenny (2007) provide one of the few studies on individual teacher 
incentives and school quality.  Specifically, they look at the impact of individual teacher 
incentives on aggregate student test scores using student-level data from the National 
Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88) matched to their own private survey on 
the use of teacher incentives in schools sampled in the NELS:88.  From the data they 
collect, they devise three measures of the strength of teacher incentives in NELS:88 
schools, ranging from low to medium to high.  Figlio and Kenny include each measure 
separately in a series of achievement equations to estimate the effect of incentive strength 
on cumulative test score performance of students.  They find, for all measures of 
incentive strength, test scores are higher in schools that reward teachers for test score 
performance.  On average, having any performance incentive raised student test scores by 
between 1.3 to 2.1 points, a magnitude they conclude is comparable to an increase of 
about 3 years in maternal education. 
 Despite Figlio and Kenny finding individual teacher performance incentives to be 
associated with higher academic performance, several issues may confound these results 
and warrant mention.  Particularly troublesome is that the authors cannot rule out 
unobserved schools quality as the driving force behind finding an incentive effect, 
especially since incentives and unobserved school quality are likely to be positively 
correlated.  In other words, schools with better achievement scores could also be the 
schools likely to institute policies like incentive programs, implying OLS estimates 
11 
  
would be biased toward finding an incentive effect.  Also of concern to their analysis is 
the timing between the last wave of the NELS:88, their source of student achievement 
data, and their own survey on teacher compensation practices in NELS:88 schools.  
Specifically, an 8-year lag exists between the two, calling into question whether the 
incentive program had actually been in effect at the time the NELS:88 was conducted.  
Despite these concerns, Figlio and Kenny provide valuable insight into the potential 
benefit of teacher incentives. 
 Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (2002) evaluate an incentive program designed to 
improve student retention in an alternative Michigan high school.  The incentive program 
awarded teachers bonus pay for meeting the following two performance targets.  First, a 
retention bonus of up to 12.5% of annual base pay was given to teachers having a large 
enough percentage of their students remaining enrolled at the end of the quarter.  A 
second bonus was given to teachers receiving a high rating on student evaluations for 
four successive quarters.  Teachers triggering the second incentive received a bonus equal 
to 5% of annual base pay and the retention bonus increased an additional 10%.  Bonuses 
awarded were nontrivial in size, with the average beginning teacher with a bachelor’s 
degree receiving a $5000 annual pay bump for meeting both performance targets.  The 
author’s employ a difference-in-difference (DID) approach that compared outcomes in 
the alternative school with the incentive program to a similar high school using a 
traditional pay scheme.  They find, consistent with the program’s goal, retention rates 
increased following implementation of the incentive program in the alternative school; 
however, other desired outcomes, including GPA and the pass rate of students remaining 
enrolled at the end of the quarter, were lower in the incentive school relative to the school 
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with traditional pay.  Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone conclude that the program was 
successful insofar as it was originally intended to boost student retention.  However, they 
also find negative outcomes on other achievement measures, potentially suggestive that 
teachers may have altered their teaching in ways that adversely affected achievement in 
an effort to game the system and obtain the performance award.5 
Ladd (1999) studies the impact of a district-wide incentive program implemented 
in the Dallas independent school district.  The program, running from 1991-92 through 
1995-96, was designed as a rank-order tournament whereby district schools were ranked 
and ordered according to student test score gains.  Top performing schools received a 
reward of $2000 toward school-related activities and teachers in winning schools were 
given a $1000 bonus.  Using panel data on schools in several large Texas cities, Ladd 
estimates the Dallas program’s effect on student test scores in math and science by 
regressing pass rates on the set of interaction terms between an indicator variable 
representing Dallas district schools and dummy variables for each year the program was 
in effect, including the year the program was implemented.  Ladd’s findings suggest, 
relative to other schools in large Texas cities, pass rates rose in Dallas schools, at least 
initially.  However, given pass rates increased sharply the year of implementation—
before the program took effect—the size and duration of the Dallas program’s impact on 
student test score performance is questionable.  At best, the program resulted in large 
gains in both math and reading test scores, and, at worst, test score improvements were 
slight and faded out shortly after implementation. 
5 A large literature examines distortions induced by incentive programs.  Chapter 2.3 discusses this 
literature. 
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In a particularly rigorous study, Lavy (2009) evaluates an individual teacher 
incentive program targeted at underperforming schools in Israel.  Teachers participating 
in the incentive program were ranked and ordered according to value-added measures of 
their students’ performance on several matriculation exams.  Top-performing teachers 
were divided into four groups, with each group receiving a bonus that ranged from 
$7,500 for the top group to $1,750 for the bottom group.  Several identification strategies 
are implemented to determine the program’s effect on achievement.  In particular, 
measurement error in the assignment of schools to receive the incentive program gives 
rise to a quasi-natural experiment whereby Lavy is able to match a group of schools 
erroneously assigned to program status to a control group of schools that did not receive 
the teacher incentive program.  For both the math and English matriculation exams, Lavy 
reports difference-in-difference estimates that indicate the take-up rate, pass rate, and 
average score increased in incentive schools relative to the control group of schools.  
Further analysis suggests these gains were the result of greater teacher effort, rather than 
dysfunctional behaviors that distort student achievement.  Finally, teacher attributes, 
including age, gender, education, experience, and teaching certification, are found to be 
uncorrelated with teacher rankings, suggesting these attributes do not reflect teacher 
effectiveness. 
In another study, Lavy (2002) evaluates a school-wide incentive program in 
Israeli schools.  The program rewarded the top one-third of all schools with a cash bonus 
based on value-added gains in student achievement among schools.  All teachers in 
winning schools received a bonus proportional to their income, with the largest bonus per 
teacher equaling almost $1,000 and the smallest $250.  Lavy employs a regression 
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discontinuity design to estimate the program’s effect on several student outcomes.  The 
regression discontinuity is based on a threshold point that determined a school's 
eligibility for receiving the program.  Specifically, a school was eligible for the program 
if it was the only one of its type in a community and a comprehensive school.  Therefore, 
Lavy argues that the group of comprehensive schools in communities with only two 
schools makes for a good comparison group since they are likely to be similar in other 
observed and unobserved ways, except that they did not receive the program.  Relative to 
the comparison group of schools, Lavy finds student test scores and participation rates 
increased in program schools, but the proportion of students entitled to a matriculation 
certificate was not statistically different from zero.  Finally, a similar sized school 
resources program that endowed schools with additional inputs, such as teaching time, 
was administered concurrently with the school-wide teacher incentive program.  For the 
resources program, Lavy also reports gains in student outcomes across several 
dimensions; however, the incentive program was determined to be a more cost-effective 
alternative. 
In a randomized study, Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremmer (2003) evaluate a teacher 
incentive program in rural Kenyan schools.  Prizes were awarded on the basis of overall 
school performance on several districts exams, administered in grades four to eight, with 
top-performing schools receiving a cash bonus between 21% and 43% of a teacher’s 
monthly pay.  Using a difference-in-difference approach, Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremmer 
find test scores were significantly higher in schools receiving the incentive program 
relative to schools not receiving the program for the shortened duration of the program.  
In addition, conditional on being enrolled, the test-taking rate of students increased in 
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incentive schools despite no difference in dropout rates between incentive schools and 
other schools.  Upon dissolution of the program, test score gains did not persist.  Glewwe 
et al. conclude that teachers responded to the incentive program in ways that boosted 
short-term results rather than encouraging long-term learning.6 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) evaluate an experimental teacher 
incentive program in India.    Schools selected to participate in the study were randomly 
assigned to one of four program groups, or alternatively a control group.  All four 
program groups were endowed with a similar-size program, with two of the four groups 
receiving a teacher incentive program and the remaining two program groups receiving a 
resources program that awarded schools extra inputs.  In addition, the teacher incentive 
program was targeted at individual teachers for one of the two experimental groups, 
while school-wide teacher incentives were used for the other group.  For both teacher 
incentive programs, awards were tied to gains in student test scores, and the award 
averaged approximately 4-5% for each program.  The analysis by Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman shows that student test scores in schools with any type of teacher incentive 
program (school-wide or individual) to be associated with higher test scores relative to a 
control group of schools.  Point estimates also suggest that individual teacher incentive 
program had a slightly larger impact on test score gains than did the school-wide teacher 
incentive program, though the difference was not statistically significant.  Finally, the 
authors find the school resources programs also improved student test scores, though the 
6 To this point, Glewe et al. (2003) find teacher attendance did not improve and the incidence of homework 
assignment did not change in program schools, while, at the same time, program schools encouraged 
students participation and increased test-taking preparation activities. 
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magnitude of the effect was not as large as that for either the individual teacher or school-
wide incentive program.7   
 Finally, Atkinson et al. (2004) assess a teacher incentives program in U.K. 
schools.  The program supplemented an existing pay scheme that paid teachers uniform 
salaries based only on experience and qualifications.  Teachers eligible for the program 
received an annual bonus of 2000 pounds and advanced to a higher pay gradient on the 
uniform pay scale.  Teachers became eligible only after demonstrating proficiency in five 
teaching areas.  Atkinson et al. find mixed results regarding the program's effect.  
Difference-in-difference (DID) estimates show value-added science scores rose for 
program teachers compared to teacher not eligible for the program.  However, math 
performance actually declined for students of program eligible teachers.  Looking at 
cumulative exam scores, no significant differences were found.  Concerned that teachers' 
experience-effectiveness profile may bias their DID estimates toward zero, Atkinson et 
al. turn to an achievement equation that includes a dummy variables for novice teacher.  
For their preferred specification, cumulative test score increased by a slight 0.5 points per 
student for students of program eligible teachers.  Despite the underwhelming evidence in 
favor of the program, it should be noted program eligibility was a function of past 
performance and not present performance of teachers. 
2.3 Nature of Teaching Hypothesis 
 Teacher incentive programs are ultimately designed to improve school quality, 
with the underlying premise being that teachers respond to performance incentives in 
positive ways.  This notion is seemingly bolstered by a number of studies finding 
7 As with Lavy (2002), Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) find teacher incentive programs to be more 
cost-effective than a similar-sized school resource program. 
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generally positive effects of teacher incentive programs, at least insofar as these programs 
help schools achieve the objective for which the program was originally intended.  
Despite mounting evidence on the benefits, a relatively small number of incentive 
programs have been implemented and remain active in U.S. schools, and previous 
attempts at establishing merit-style or performance-based incentive schemes have been 
met with widespread failure and considerable skepticism. 
 The lack of teacher incentive programs in public schools has been a source of 
debate among researchers for quite some time.  Ballou (2001), among others, suggests the 
opposition of teachers’ unions is largely responsible since merit-style incentive schemes 
play a much larger role in teacher salaries the lesser the degree of influence teachers’ 
unions have over public school districts.8  On the other hand, Murnane and Cohen 
(1986), drawing heavily on the personnel economics literature to highlight a number of 
important concerns, argue that it is the type of work teachers do on a daily basis that 
make performance-based pay programs impracticable for use in public schools.  
Goldhaber (2005), as well as Podgursky and Springer (2007), have coined this the 
“Nature of Teaching” hypothesis.  
 Perhaps the most well-known and highly publicized “Nature of Teaching” 
problem is the multitasking problem highlighted by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).  
The complexity and multidimensionality of teachers’ job, which can range from a variety 
of things such as imparting basic reading, writing, and math skills to promoting a drug-
free environment to teaching creative thinking skills, makes accurately measuring what 
8 Ballou (2001) specifically finds that merit pay plans survive longer in districts that do not engage in 
collective bargaining or confer with a union, and the size of the merit award is larger the lesser the role 
unions play in school districts. 
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teachers do hard.9  Moreover, to the extent multiple goals compete for the time and 
attention of teachers and for school resources, some objectives may go largely ignored in 
favor of other objectives.  This is considered to be especially true if performance awards 
are tied to objectives that are, by necessity, easily observable and other important but 
hard to measure objectives are substitutes in the education production process.  In this 
case, theory predicts teachers neglect objectives not explicitly rewarded to focus on 
objectives rewarded with higher pay.10 
 A second “Nature of Teaching” issue is team production.  To a considerable 
extent, teams of teachers are responsible for student performance, making it difficult to 
measure the value of an individual teacher’s contribution to student or school 
performance.  Introducing performance incentives may create many unintended 
consequences among teachers within schools, including a breakdown in cooperation and 
communication between teachers.  This could unintentionally harm student outcomes 
rather than benefit schools in achieving the desired goals of the program.  Moreover, even 
school-wide performance incentives do not guarantee cooperation.  Freeridership may 
encourage distortions in effort since the performance award to individual teachers is a 
function of the group performance, with each teacher typically receiving an equal share 
of the performance award regardless of individual effort. 
 A final “Nature of Teaching” issue Murnane and Cohen (1986) mention is the 
problem of performance evaluations.  Incentive programs often try to measure teacher 
performance using some observable measure of their students’ performance.  Often  
times this is just the test score performance of students on a standardized exam.  Other 
9 For a list of the various public school objectives, see Dixit (2002). 
10 This assumes tasks are substitutes in production.  In the event tasks are compliments in production, 
rewarding a particular task also increases attention and effort on related tasks. 
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times, administrator evaluations or peer review may be the basis for rewards for good 
performance or sanctions for poor performance.  Each comes with its own set of 
problems. 
 It is often believed standardized test scores are poor measures because they do not 
accurately capture teachers’ contribution to student learning.  Test scores are not only a 
function of current teachers and the things that they do that impact student learning, but 
also the effort of many previous teachers and these teachers’ contribution to learning, as 
well as the underlying ability of students.  This potentially suggests that some teachers’ 
or schools’ success or failure is random from year-to-year and based on the “luck of the 
draw” as determined by the ability of students, and not necessarily because of superior 
classroom performance or poor classroom performance.  To alleviate these concerns, 
value-added test scores have been suggested as an alternative to test score levels.  Value-
added measures are intended to capture changes in exam performance and measure a 
teacher’s true contribution by netting out mitigating factors, such as innate ability, 
demographics and socioeconomic influences, and per-pupil spending, which can all 
influence students’ exam performance.  To the extent more sophisticated value-added 
measures can be designed to accurately and robustly capture teacher performance, linking 
pay to performance may not be as problematic as it once was. 
 Merit-style programs are a type of incentive program that uses supervisor 
evaluation, and sometimes peer review, to evaluate performance and reward teachers for 
superior classroom performance.  Murnane and Cohen (1986) argue merit evaluations fail 
because supervisors cannot specifically provide answers as to why teachers do not 
receive the performance award and what teachers’ must do in order to achieve the award 
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in the future.  As a result, they conclude merit pay may actually harm students if teachers 
lose morale over being given a rating below their expectation and exert less classroom 
effort in response.  Ballou and Podgursky (1993), however, find no evidence suggesting 
this is the case in public schools.  They report so long as evaluations are perceived to be 
fair, merit style pay schemes do not demoralize teachers, even among those not receiving 
the performance award. 
  These “Nature of Teaching” issues have led critics to argue incentive programs 
will encourage an assortment of unintended consequences, including teachers shifting 
attention away from other important aspects in the educational process and toward 
aspects with explicit financial rewards; neglect low ability students unlikely to meet 
minimum levels of performance; manipulate the composition of test-takers to improve 
exam scores;  free-ridership; cheat; and strategically behave in a number of other 
distortionary ways.  A bulk of economics literature documents several unintended 
consequences associated with performance incentive programs. 
 Jacob (2005) evaluates a high-stakes accountability program implemented in 
Chicago Public Schools in 1996-97.  The program was designed to raise student 
performance, with teachers and administrators in low performing schools subject to 
severe penalties, including firing or reassignment.  Using an approach similar to a 
difference-in-difference estimator, Jacob finds exam performance increased sharply on 
the high-stakes exam following introduction of the accountability program.  However, 
around the same time, a similar exam was administered that did not punish schools for 
poor performance.  For this low-stakes exam, no similar gains in the exam performance 
of students were found.  This suggests, at least in part, the gains were a result of teachers 
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focusing on exam-specific skills, though increases in student test taking effort also played 
a role in exam score gains. 
 In another study of Chicago Public Schools, Jacob and Levitt (2003) examine 
teacher cheating in elementary grade schools after implementation of an accountability-
based testing program.  To detect cheating classrooms, Jacob and Levitt devise an 
algorithm based on unexpected exam score fluctuations year-to-year and unusual patterns 
of correlation on student answer strings within classrooms.  They then estimate the 
prevalence of cheating by comparing the actual number of classrooms above a threshold 
value of correlation between the two indicators of cheating relative to the expected 
number of classrooms given that threshold.  Their identifying assumption is based on the 
notion that unusually high correlation between the two indicators would likely occur only 
in instances where a classroom had, in fact, cheated.  Using this strategy, Jacob and 
Levitt find that between 3.5 and 5.6 of all classrooms cheated on at least one subject 
exam per year from 1993-2000.11 
 Figlio and Winicki (2002), in an unusual study, look at whether Virginia schools 
altered the nutritional content of their school lunch in an apparent attempt to boost short-
term cognitive functioning and improve student test scores.  Since 1995, Virginia’s 
Standards of Learning program has held schools accountable for meeting minimum 
performance levels on a state-mandated exam, with schools failing to meet these 
minimum levels subject to possible sanctions.  Figlio and Winciki find, for schools under 
the threat of sanctions, caloric intake of students increased on testing days relative to non-
testing days, while no similar change in caloric intake occurred in schools not under the 
threat of sanctions.  In addition, schools manipulating the nutritional content of their 
11 This is based on a correlation threshold between the two indicators ranging from the 80th-95th percentile. 
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school lunch also saw the most improvement in student test scores, suggesting schools 
facing sanctions for performance may have engaged in strategic behaviors to improve 
student exam performance. 
Several researchers look at the extent to which schools manipulate the 
composition of test-takers in an effort to inflate test scores.  Figlio (2006) explores 
disparities in the punishments received by student involved in similar infractions based 
on their expected exam performance on Florida’s high-stakes accountability exam the 
FCAT.12  The FCAT, which was implemented at the start of the 1996-97 academic year, 
provided an extra layer of accountability by providing students in underperforming 
schools the opportunity to transfer to a better school via a voucher program.  Figlio uses a 
difference-in-difference approach whereby he regresses the suspension duration of 
students on a three-way interaction term between dummy variables for high-stakes testing 
grade, high or low achiever, and testing window.  His findings suggest expected low-
achievers receive substantially longer suspensions relative to high achievers involved in 
similar incidences, and expected low-achievers were roughly 12% more likely to miss the 
high-stakes exam altogether compared to high-achievers as a result.  Thus, it appears 
schools may have engaged in selective punishment, thereby removing students expected 
to perform poorly on the FCAT from counting against the cumulative exam performance 
of schools by missing the exam altogether. 
Cullen and Reback (2006) study the relationship between a state-wide 
accountability program and changes in the composition of exam-takers in Texas schools 
from 1993-1998.  Texas’ accountability program, the Texas Assessment of Academic 
Skills (TAAS), tested students on various subjects in various grades, with extremely poor 
12 FCAT stands for Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test. 
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performing schools subject to disciplinary measures, including students being allowed to 
transfer to the school of their choice.   Empirically, Cullen and Reback find that the 
percentage of exemptions increased in schools as the marginal benefit to schools from an 
increase in exemptions rose.   Moreover, it appears most the rise in exemptions resulted 
from schools’ classifying students as special needs or from increased absenteeism, 
possibly suggesting that schools with the most to gain from improved ratings tried to 
game exam scores by strategically removing students expected to perform poorly from 
the test pool either through the classification of students as special needs or encouraging 
student absenteeism on test days. 
Figlio and Getzler (2002) likewise explore the extent to which high-stakes 
accountability testing led schools to behave strategically by classifying students into test 
exempt groups.  Figlio and Getzler draw on student-level data from six anonymous 
districts in Florida to explore the ramifications of the implementation of Florida’s FCAT 
in 1996-97.  Their findings suggest, after Florida began FCAT, assignment of students to 
test exempt groups rose sharply, particularly for disabled and special education 
categories.  In addition, high poverty schools were much more likely to reclassify 
students into test exempt categories, presumably because these schools had the most to 
gain from improved exam performance. 
 Ahn (2008) evaluates North Carolina’s state-wide accountability program to 
discern the effects of teacher effort in public schools using data on individual teacher 
absences.  North Carolina’s accountability program is unique in that its primary 
performance mechanism is a cash bonus for teachers in schools producing student test 
score gains above a performance threshold, with teachers in top performing schools 
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earning a cash award as large as $1,500.  In response to the accountability program, Ahn 
finds effort, as measured by teacher absences, to be positively associated with the exam 
score performance of students.  Additionally, as the number of teachers within a school 
increased, so too did the number of days a teacher was absent from school.  Given that 
the North Carolina accountability program employs school-wide rewards for 
performance, Ahn suggests this is indicative of a free-rider problem in which incentives 
for performance are weakened in groups. 
2.4 School Choice Programs 
 Another widely popular set of education reforms are school choice programs.  
School choice programs contrast teacher incentive programs, which attempt to make 
teacher pay more professionally competitive, by attempting to make the education 
markets more competitive.  In effect, school choice programs enhance competition in 
education by increasing the number of schooling alternatives available to parents, with 
the idea being the greater the number of available alternatives the greater the incentive for 
schools to improve school quality.   Examples of school choice programs include 
vouchers for private schools, magnet schools, charter schools,, inter-district choice 
programs, and intra-district choice programs, among others.  All choice programs extend 
traditional public school choice—that arising from parents’ residential decision among 
local school districts—inter-district competition.13 
2.4.1 Tiebout Competition 
 Competition in elementary and secondary education has been modeled in an 
assortment of ways.  Several studies build on a conceptual framework similar to that 
developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), which portrays governmental bureaucrats 
13 This type of competition is commonly referred to as Tiebout competition. 
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as having a self-interested, big government agenda that can be mitigated, at least in part, 
by competition among local governments.  Tiebout (1956) likewise perceived the 
potential benefits of competition, suggesting that the residential decision of households, 
when there exists a sufficiently large number of varying communities, can lead to the 
efficient sorting of households through preference revelation.14  Studies drawing on these 
theoretical frameworks usually equate school district to local governments, with the idea 
being that the more school district fragmentation in a particular area, such as a county or 
metropolitan area, the stronger are the competitive forces at play.  The basic assumption 
underlying these types of models is that parents explicitly value the quality of their 
children’s education and can “vote with their feet” if their current district does not 
provided the desired quality of education.  Therefore, the greater the school district 
fragmentation in an education market, the lower the cost to parents of exercising some 
form of choice. 
Empirically, the impact of inter-district competition is unclear, at least in terms of 
its effect on student achievement.  Hoxby (2000) is one of few researchers to examine 
inter-district competition and student achievement, while also attempting to correct for 
the likely endogeneity of observed market concentration measures based on district 
enrollment  Confining her analysis to MSAs, Hoxby constructs an MSA-level Herfindahl 
index designed to capture the amount of inter-district competition among MSAs.  
However, because parents are likely to switch from unproductive districts to productive 
districts, the index of inter-district competition is probably endogenous to observed 
school performance.  Hoxby thus instruments for inter-district competition using the 
count of MSA large rivers and small streams, arguing that large rivers and small streams 
14 Obviously Tiebout was referring to the provision of public expenditures and residences self-sorting. 
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are credible instrument since they were historical determinants of district boundaries in 
the early formation of school districts.  Finding presented by Hoxby suggest that, for 
several outcomes, including student exam scores and school productivity, inter-district 
competition has positive and statistically significant effects, particularly when moving 
from minimum to maximum levels of inter-district competition. 
 Although Hoxby (2000) finds positive effects of inter-district competition, others 
find conflicting evidence.  In particular, Rothstein (2011), in an attempt to replicate the 
results produced by Hoxby finds far less robust evidence on the effectiveness of inter-
district competition as it relates to student exam scores in reading and math.  
Furthermore, Rothstein finds that Hoxby’s main estimates are highly sensitive to the 
count of large rivers that Hoxby’s analysis is largely based on.  When specifying various 
alternatives large rivers and small streams variables as instruments, most if not all 
estimates decrease in size and become not statistically different from zero, especially for 
8th and 12th grade reading exam scores. 
2.4.2 Charter Competition 
 Other studies model competition as parents’ ability to choose among an 
alternative school or group of schools.  Such an example includes charter schools, which 
have been gaining in popularity as an alternative to TPSs over the last couple decades.  
Charter schools are unique in that they are public schools, open to all students choosing 
to attend free-of-charge, and operate under a performance contract with a chartering 
authority.  In exchange for performance, charter schools receive freedom from local 
school districts and many of the red-tape policies and procedures that govern schools in 
these districts.  Since charter schools are public in nature, like TPSs, they rely on public 
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funding or private donations to survive.  In fact, charter schools receive a portion of 
taxpayer dollars appropriated for public schools for each student enrolling in a charter 
school.  Because charter schools receive funds that otherwise would have gone to TPSs in 
their absence, TPSs have a financial stake in preventing students from attending charter 
schools, placing these two public school types in direct competition with each other for 
students and taxpayer dollars. 
 Several studies look at the effect of charter school competition on the academic 
performance of students, arguing that student achievement could improve if the threat of 
parents choosing charter schools spurs TPSs to improve school quality.  The empirical 
evidence on the issue is seemingly mixed, with several studies reporting conflicting 
evidence on the effectiveness of charter school competition in improving the academic 
outcomes of students in TPSs.  That is, some recent studies find positive effects, some 
find no effects, and others yet find negative effects.  In large part, this is most likely due 
to the localized nature of the education market being examined. 
Winters (2012) explores the impact of charter school competition on student 
outcomes using student-level data on students in New York City public schools in grades 
3-8 from the 2005-06 through the 2008-09 school-year.  Winters uses the longitudinal 
nature of the data to identify students leaving traditional publics school at year’s end and 
enrolling in a charter school the following school-year to calculate the percentage of a 
school’s students leaving for charters schools.  Schools are assumed to face increasing 
competition from charter schools if the percentage of students leaving for charter schools 
is increasing.  In addition, fixed effects at the student-level and/or school-level are 
employed to eliminate any unobserved differences in student ability.  For models that 
28 
  
include student fixed effects only, student scores in math rise by 0.02 standard deviations 
as the percentage of students leaving for charter schools grows by 1%, and student scores 
in English Language Arts likewise sees a mild but statistically significant increase with 
an increase in charter competition. 
 Imberman (2011) uses data on students in a large urban school district located in 
the U.S. southwest to examine the effect of charter school competition on student 
achievement in TPSs.  To measure charter competition, Imberman uses the share of 
charter enrollment in overlapping grades and within a 1.0 and 1.5 mile radius of TPSs.  
However, given the likely nonrandom location decision of charter schools, a 2SLS 
approach is employed whereby the availability of existing commercial space between 30k 
– 60k square feet near TPSs is used as an instrumental variable for charter share, with the 
idea being that charter schools tend to rent space or have space donated when first 
starting up and these types of structures are ideal for start-up schools.15  Additionally, 
student fixed effects are included in all regressions to discount the possibility of student 
selection into charters biasing estimates.  For both math and language arts, Imberman 
finds charter competition has a negative and statistically significant effect on test scores, 
with the effect being strongest for students in grades 1-5. 
 Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, and Jansen (2008) analyze student-level data in 
TPSs in Texas to evaluate the effect of charter penetration on changes in TASS 
achievement scores.  The authors estimate several value-added achievement equations, 
including either a district-level measure or campus-level measure of charter penetration 
in each model.  Also, to account for changes in student composition or underlying student 
15 Imberman (2009) also uses the # of shopping malls within a certain radius of TPSs as a second 
instrument. 
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ability potentially biasing estimates, campus fixed effects and/or student fixed effects are 
included in all regressions.  Moreover, since charter penetration is likely nonrandom as 
well, they instrument for charter penetration to alleviate any further concerns of 
endogeneity.  For their preferred specification, which includes both campus and student 
fixed effects, Booker et al. report IV estimates that indicate charter competition has a 
small but positive and statistically significant effect on TASS value-added scores in both 
reading and math.  Moreover, these gains persist at both the district and campus-levels. 
 Bifulco and Ladd (2006), using student-level data on cohorts of third grade 
students in North Carolina between 1996-2000 and following the first two cohorts until 
the eighth grade and all other cohorts until 2001-02, examine student test score gains 
observed in TPSs both before and after the opening of a nearby charter school.  For 
students in TPSs with the nearest charter school located between 2.5 and 5 miles and 5 
and 10 miles, charter competition appears to have a positive and significant effect on 
math scores gains, while positive gains in reading occur only when the closest charter is 
located between 5-10 miles. No effects, in reading or math, are found for schools 
between 0-2.5 miles from the nearest charter.  However, once allowing for student and 
school fixed effects, all estimates of charter competition lose statistical significance. 
 Sass (2006) utilizes student-level panel data on students in grades 3-10 in Florida 
public schools for the 2001-02 school-year to explore charter competition and exam 
performance on Florida’s FCAT.  To account for potential unobserved school quality 
biasing estimates of the charter effect, Sass estimates a school fixed effect model, 
including a variety of alternative charter measures within a 0-2.5, 2.5-5, and 5-10 mile 
radius of the closest TPSs.  For each measure within these radii, Sass finds charter 
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competition has large, positive impacts on the test score performance of traditional public 
school students, with the effects in math being somewhat larger and more robust than the 
effects on reading scores.   
 Bettinger (2005) studies the effect of charter competition on reading and math 
scores of Michigan 4th graders in TPSs.  Bettinger uses the number of charter schools 
within a 5-mile radius of TPSs as the relevant measure of charter competition.  However, 
since a charter school’s location decision is likely correlated with residual school 
achievement, an instrumental variables approach is used to identify charter competition’s 
effect.  Using a lagged dependent variable specification, Bettinger finds little significant 
evidence to suggest the number of charter schools within a 5-mile radius affects the exam 
performance of TPSs in reading or math.  Moreover, to the extent charter schools draw 
the academically weakest students out of TPSs, small, positive, and insignificant point 
estimates may actually overstate the effect, even to the point where the true charter effect 
on academic performance could be negative. 
 Holmes, DeSimone, and Rupp (2003) also look at the effect of the distance of the 
nearest charter school relative to TPSs on average test score performance of students.  
Using data on North Carolina students in grades 3-8 between 1996-97 and 1999-00, 
Holmes et al. include various charter distance measures in several lagged dependent 
variable models.  They find, for several alternative models, generally consistent evidence 
suggesting schools facing charter competition fare about 1% better on achievement 
exams compared to other schools.  However, data limitations preclude Holmes et al. from 
distinguishing whether their findings result from charter competition or from changes in 
student composition.  That is, whether the increase is due to less able students leaving for 
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charter teachers in hopes of finding a school that better meets students’ needs.  If this 
happens, it could simultaneously raise the average ability of TPS students and lower the 
average ability of charters. 
 Lastly, Hoxby (2002) evaluates the impact of charter school competition on 
student achievement in Michigan and Arizona.  Hoxby uses a critical threshold of 6% of 
total district enrollment belonging to charter schools to separate schools facing charter 
competition from those facing no charter competition in these states.  Using a difference-
in-difference approach that compares test scores both before and after the introduction of 
charter legislation, Hoxby finds, in both Michigan and Arizona, average achievement 
improved by between 1 and 3 national percentile rank points in schools facing charter 
competition compared to other schools. 
2.5 Competition and Teacher Pay 
 Economic theory suggests increased competition in the education market could 
not only benefit student, but also significantly affect the labor market opportunities of 
TPS teachers.  First, schools facing increased competitive pressure could respond by 
hiring teachers particularly adept at attracting and retaining students since public funding 
is tied to student enrollment.  This suggests a shift in the demand for high quality 
teachers, which could manifest into higher salaries for teachers.  A second possibility is 
that increased competition could cause TPSs to have trouble retaining high quality 
teachers, resulting in a decrease in the supply of high quality teachers and also higher 
pay.  Third, to the extent districts’ with considerable market power depress wages, 
increased market pressures could result in salary competition and higher pay for teachers.  
Lastly, competition may reduce teacher pay if competition eliminates economic rents 
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generated by monopolistic districts if these rents are disbursed to school personnel.  This 
Chapter reviews the empirical evidence, paying especially close attention to the effect of 
inter-district competition and charter competition on teacher salaries in TPSs. 
2.5.1  Tiebout Competition 
 Hoxby (2002) and Taylor (2010) provide some of the few empirical studies 
regarding Tiebout competition and the teaching profession.  Both studies equate 
schooling markets with MSAs, and each constructs an MSA-level Herfindahl index, the 
sum of the squared per-unit (district) enrollments over total MSA enrollment, to capture 
the amount of inter-district competition in MSAs.  In addition, both use an instrumental 
variables approach to account for possible endogeneity issues associated with their 
Herfindahl construct, though the set of instrument differ between studies primarily 
because Hoxby (2002) is a national study of school teachers, while Taylor (2010) limits 
her analysis to teachers in Texas MSAs. 
 Hoxby (2002) estimates several equations to try and distinguish the effect of inter-
district choice on the teaching profession.  Her empirical approach is two-pronged.  First, 
Hoxby estimates several quantity equations to determine if inter-district choice affects the 
number of teacher’s possessing particular attributes, such as Master’s degree or math and 
science skills.  Secondly, Hoxby estimates a single wage equation that includes the 
Herfindahl index and the interaction between the Herfindahl index and each of the 
teacher attributes.  The estimate on the various interaction terms yield the effect of inter-
district choice on the incremental wage paid for each additional unit of the teacher 
attribute.  This empirical strategy allows Hoxby to conclude whether inter-district choice 
encourages schools to differentiate teacher jobs by demanding more (less) of specific 
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teacher attributes by employing more (less) of and paying more (less) for these attributes.  
Her findings suggest that competition would raise the demand for teachers attending 
higher quality colleges, possessing more math and science skills, and placing extra effort 
in school (working more hours), and inter-district competition would lower the demand 
for Master’s degrees and teaching certification. 
Taylor (2010) also explores competition’s effect on pay.  Using panel data on 
Texas teachers, Taylor estimates several specifications, including a Herfindahl index and 
the square of the Herfindahl in each, to allow for possible non-linearities arising between 
competition and teacher salaries.  Moreover, the model allows Taylor to examine 
monopsony and rent-sharing effects on pay, which, she argues, could have significant 
implications as to the effect of an increase in competitive on teacher pay.  For all 
specifications, Taylor finds a highly significant, non-linear relationship between 
competition and teacher pay, implying the overall effect of competition on wages 
depends on the initial amount of competition in markets.  In relatively competitive 
markets, wages fall as market concentration increases.  However, in relatively 
concentrated markets, market concentration has the opposite effect on compensation.  
Thus, Taylor demonstrates both monopsony and rent-sharing behavior in Texas schools, 
and concludes policies aimed at encouraging competition could have different outcomes 
on pay depending on the initial amount of competition in teachers’ market. 
2.5.2  Charter Competition 
 Taylor (2006) studies the relationship between charter competition and teacher 
compensation in Texas public schools.  Taylor focuses her analysis on urban school 
districts, where the vast majority of charter schools in Texas are located, and defines a 
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schooling market for each district as the district plus all districts within a reasonable 
commuting distance.  To estimate charter competition’s effect, the share of public 
enrollment in charter schools is used as the relevant measure of charter competition in 
districts’ market.  In addition, Taylor’s model includes a Herfindahl index of traditional 
public school competition and the square of both charter share and the Herfindahl index 
to isolate the effects of charter competition and explore aspects of rent-sharing and 
oligopoly power.  Since charter share is likely endogenous to the location decision of 
charter schools, a 2SLS approach is used to identify its effect on teacher compensation.  
The findings by Taylor suggest an oligopoly effect and wages increases with charter 
competition in markets with an initial charter share greater than 0.77%, while no pattern 
of rent-sharing emerges with charter competition.  Also, charter competition is found to 
have differential effects on wages according to experience-level, with the charter share 
having the most beneficial effect on beginning teachers and no effect on the most 
experienced teachers. 
 Jackson (2011) examines the impact of charter competition on the wages of 
traditional public school teachers in North Carolina.  The author takes a somewhat 
different tact than previous studies that explore the effect of charter school competition 
on pay by taking charter school entry within a reasonable vicinity of TPSs as the relevant 
measure of charter competition.  Since charter entry is most likely nonrandom, a 
difference-in-difference approach is used to estimate the effect of charter entry on teacher 
salaries.  Additionally, Jackson includes school fixed effects to eliminate any time-
invariant, school-specific shocks that might bias cross-sectional estimates.  Jackson finds 
that charter entry has a marginally significant but positive effect on teacher compensation 
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if charter entry occurs within a 10-mile radius of TPSs, with the effect being largest 
(about 1%) in hard-to-staff schools.  No effect on pay is found when the radius is 
narrowed to 2-mile radius or expanded to a 20-miles radius.  Jackson interprets this as 
evidence of a 10-mile radius as being the appropriate distance to measure the competitive 
effects of charter entry. 
2.5.3  Private School Competition 
Other studies examine more traditional forms of school choice, namely that 
arising from private schools.  Vedder and Hall (2000), using district-level data on Ohio 
teachers, estimate teacher earnings equations that include a measure of both public 
competition (number of districts per county) and private school competition (share of 
student enrollment in private schools).  They find, for both measures, competition 
increases the average annual salary of teachers, though the effects appear modest.  
Annual teacher salaries average about 2% more when moving from one district per 
county to 12 districts per county.  Additionally, increasing the share of private enrollment 
by 20%, compared to districts having no private school enrollment, raises the pay 
teachers receive by about 3%, on average. 
Hoxby (1994) also looks at the effect of public-private choice on teacher wages, 
among a host of other things.  Hoxby uses the share of secondary enrollment in Catholic 
schools as the relevant measure of private school competition, and employs an 
instrumental variables approach to estimate private school competition’s effect on pay 
since, she argues, the share of private enrollment is likely correlated with unobserved 
public school quality.  That is, the share of private enrollment will be higher in counties 
with poor public schools.  Findings by Hoxby suggest that private school competition has 
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a positive effect on the salaries of teachers working in public schools, with a 10 
percentage point increase in the share of Catholic school enrollment generating a 6.5% 
increase in the average starting salary for teachers with a Bachelor’s degree. 
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3 Empirical Strategy 
 The empirical analysis that follows in Chapter 5 seeks to identify competition’s 
effect on teacher pay, while the analysis in Chapter 6 examines the relationship between 
competition and the characteristics, skills, and attributes of teacher working in public 
schools.  In a comprehensive review of the empirical literature, Belfield and Levin (2000) 
suggest that the validity of an empirical analysis concerning competition’s effect on 
outcomes in elementary and secondary education relies on the notion of an education 
market, construct of competition, and soundness of estimation technique.  First, an 
education market is generally said to exist when parents have a feasible set of alternatives 
apart from the local school district.  Potential alternatives could take the form of private 
schools, charter schools, homeschooling programs, intra-district choice programs, and 
inter-district competition.16  Second, competition requires not only the existence of 
multiple education providers, but also consideration of the ways in which different 
education providers compete.17  For example, intra-district competition (competition 
among TPSs within a district) would likely yield weaker competitive effects than inter-
district competition (competition among districts) if TPSs do not have financial 
autonomy and school districts control the allocation of resources.  On the other hand, 
charter schools could potentially generate strong competitive effects due to financial 
repercussions districts stand to incur when a student chooses a charter school over a local 
TPS.  Finally, estimation plays perhaps the most important role in empirical studies of 
16 Homeschooling is another feasible alternative available to parents and a substantial fraction of students 
participate in homeschooling.  However, data limitations prevent us from exploring homeschooling as 
another form of competition. 
17 Competition should also consider the costs associated with parents exercising schooling alternatives.  
Costs tend to be higher in areas with fewer readily available alternatives, such as in more rural areas.  Costs 
also tend to differ along socioeconomic lines, with the costs of alternatives higher for low-income families.  
Costs are described in further detail below. 
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competition’s effect.  It has been well-established that many common measures of 
competition are correlated with unobservable factors that affect the supply and demand of 
competition.  Therefore, appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that estimates of the 
effects of competition are free from potential biases, such as omitted variable bias and 
strict endogeneity issues.  The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to describing the 
education market, competition construct, and estimation strategy used to identify the 
effect of three major forms of competition of interest to this study in Tiebout competition, 
charter competition, and private school competition. 
3.1 Measuring Tiebout Competition 
 Competition among districts is commonly associated with Charles Tiebout, and, 
in fact, is often referred to as Tiebout competition.  In a seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) 
noted the potential importance of “competition” among communities as it relates to 
achieving an efficient allocation of local public goods.  Although Tiebout did not speak 
directly to competition, he did realize the significance of the number of communities in 
the provision of local public goods.  On pg. 418, Tiebout states that “the greater the 
number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the 
consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position.”  Tiebout suggests that, 
when households are free to vote with their feet, the solution to the local public goods 
problem is achieved by the efficient sorting of households through preference 
revelation—the greater the number of “competing” communities, the closer the provision  
to achieving the efficient allocation when households choose their residence according to 
these preferences.   
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The key assumption of the Tiebout model is that households register demand by 
freely moving from community to community.  Hoxby (2000) outlines an alternative 
version of the Tiebout model whereby households are constrained by job location and 
income considerations and households are assumed to exercise Tiebout choice over all 
school districts within a reasonable commuting distance given their preferences for 
school expenditures and commuting distance.  Potentially problematic to analyzing 
Tiebout competition’s effect is the concept of an education market.  Rural areas tend to 
have fewer school districts within a reasonable commuting distance than do urban areas, 
and some rural areas do not have any districts within reason.  This makes exercising some 
form of Tiebout choice difficult and the costs of exercising Tiebout competition not very 
realistic in rural areas and areas where educational boundaries are not very well-defined 
in general.  We thus correlate education markets with Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs).  MSAs are defined as geographic entities containing at least one urbanized 
cluster of 50,000 or more population, and consisting of one or more whole counties 
containing the urban core plus adjacent counties having a high degree of social and 
economic integration with the urban core.18  MSAs comprise about a third of all U.S. 
counties in making up the 362 MSAs contained across the 50 states, and over three-
fourths of all student enrollment can be found in MSAs.19   
The amount of Tiebout competition varies greatly across MSAs.  For example, 
some MSAs, such as Boston or New York, have many dozens of districts within a 
reasonable commuting distance.  Other MSAs have very few or even a single school 
district serving the entire MSA, such as the Miami-Dade MSA.  The variance in the 
18 See the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for more information.  
19 Based on the OMB’s June 2003 standards.   
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amount of Tiebout competition across MSAs is directly associated with costs of 
households exercising Tiebout choice within MSAs.  Additionally, as noted by Hoxby, 
the relevant costs of Tiebout competition are not relocation costs, but the costs associated 
with choosing a residence for its school spending and not for its other associated 
characteristics, such as commuting distance to work, parks, quality healthcare, and the 
like.  These costs are incurred daily, whereas relocation costs are a one-time occurrence.  
For MSAs with many comparable districts in terms of school expenditures, the costs of 
exercising Tiebout choice are relatively low because households will have to compromise 
less on other important preferences in their residential decision since many comparable 
districts are within a reasonable distance.  On the contrary, the costs will be higher in 
MSAs with few comparable districts since households will have to give up more of the 
other residential characteristics they prefer in order to obtain their preferred level of 
school spending.20 
The costs of Tiebout competition appear to be inversely related to the number of 
comparable districts over which parents can exercise some form of choice.  Therefore, a 
measure of Tiebout competition should, at a minimum, account for the number of 
districts, or feasible alternatives.  Arguably the more comparable districts per MSA the 
lower are the costs of exercising Tiebout choice and the greater the amount of Tiebout 
competition within an MSA.  However, some districts may be more desirable than others, 
possibly because they have more successful schools or higher levels of per-pupil 
expenditures which match parents’ preferences.  More desirable districts would likely 
have a greater share of the student enrollment than less desirable districts.  Measures of 
20 Hoxby provides the example of a single MSA district in which most residences and jobs are located in 
the district, causing households to have to deviate far from their preferences for commuting distance to 
obtain their preference for school spending since the best alternative district is a long commute away. 
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Tiebout competition should also take district enrollment into consideration, in addition to 
the number of districts within MSAs.  Following Hoxby (2000), among others, we 
measure the amount of Tiebout competition using a Herfindahl index based on district 
enrollment shares of total MSA enrollment.21  Formally, the measure is given by: 
𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 =  1 −�𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚2𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑑=1
 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚2  is equal to district d’s squared share of enrollment in MSA m.  The measure of 
Tiebout-style competition varies continuously between 0 and 1, with a value of 1 
indicating a very large number of equal-sized school district providers and a value equal 
to 0 corresponding to a single school district monopolizing the entire MSA.  For example, 
as previously mentioned, New York and Boston have dozens of school districts 
throughout their respective MSAs with relatively proportional student enrollment, 
corresponding to a very high amount of Tiebout competition according to the described 
index above.  Conversely, Miami has almost its entire student enrollment in the same 
school district, and, therefore, an index of Tiebout competition corresponding to 0, or 
minimal Tiebout competition.  Finally, this measure has a rather intuitive interpretation.  
It is the probability that in a random meeting between two students from the same MSA, 
they would be enrolled in a TPS in different districts.  For Boston or New York, this 
probability is well in excess of 0.90, while in Miami, this probability is nil.  For most 
MSAs, this probability falls somewhere between the Boston and New York MSAs and 
the Miami MSA. 
 
21 The measure includes only TPS enrollment. 
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3.2 Measuring Charter Competition 
 Other studies model competition as parents’ ability to choose an alternative 
school or group of schools apart from TPSs. Charter schools are a primary example of 
this and have become increasingly popular as an alternative to TPSs since the first two 
charter schools opened in St. Paul Minnesota more than two decades ago.  As of 
December 2014, more than 2.5 million students nationwide were enrolled in over 6,500 
charter schools, and some form of charter school legislation has been passed in 42 out of 
the 50 U.S. states.22   
Charter schools are unique in that they are independent public schools that operate 
under a performance contract with a chartering authority, such as a local district or 
university.23  In exchange for performance, charter schools are exempted from many of 
the rules and regulations that TPSs must follow.  If charter schools underperform, the 
charter school’s charter can be revoked and many have closed as a result of poor 
performance.24  Additionally, charter schools are open to any student wishing to attend at 
no cost, and in the case of oversubscription, enrollment is determined at random by a 
lottery process.  Finally, although who can operate charter schools and the particulars of 
what charter schools do varies from state to state, charter schools are schools of choice 
and rely on parents choosing to send their children to charter schools to remain in 
business.  When a parent chooses a charter school, in some states as much as 100% of the 
funding tied to the student goes to the charter school.25   In the absence of the charter, this 
22 Source: Center for Education Reform. 
23 The legal issuers of charters varies from state-to-state. 
24 Since 1992, as many as 15% of charter schools have closed for either poor performance or lack of 
funding. 
25 Charter schools receive an average of 64% of the average per-pupil funding that TPSs receive (Center for 
Education Reform). 
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is funding that would have otherwise gone to the district.  Since charter schools are 
prohibited from charging tuition, they rely heavily on public support from attracting 
students.  This places charter schools and school districts in direction competition 
whereby charter schools must attract students and their associated tax dollars in order to 
survive and districts have a financial stake in preventing students from leaving for charter 
schools. 
Although the primary goal of charter schools is to improve the achievement of 
charter students, many have suggested a competition effect could emerge in which 
charter schools incentivize TPSs to improve student achievement and become more 
efficient education providers.  The degree to which charter schools are perceived as 
competitors to school districts has been measured in a number of different ways, 
including the share of students exiting TPSs for charter schools from one year to the next, 
the distance a charter school locates from the nearest TPS, and the percentage of total 
charter school enrollment in an area.  Since we confine the analysis to MSAs, we take the 
share of MSA enrollment attending charter schools as the relevant statistic.  Formally, the 
measure is: 
𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 = �𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 �𝑚𝑚 
where m denotes MSA.  Charter enrollment is simply the total number of students 
enrolled in charter schools across the MSA and total enrollment is the total charter 
school, private school, and TPS enrollment within the MSA.  Some states, such as 
Michigan and Arizona where charter schools have been in existence for well over a 
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decade, have a relatively large share of its student population attending charter schools.  
Other states have no charter law and consequently no charter school competition.26   
3.3 Measuring Private School Competition 
 A third form of competition included in the analysis that follows in Chapters 5 
and 6 is that arising from private school choice.  Private schools have long been 
considered one of the foremost alternatives parents exercise choice over.  Furthermore, 
despite the rise in the popularity of charter schools, private schools continue to enroll a 
substantial share of students, with enrollment in private schools more than double that of 
charter schools.  Therefore, examining private school competition may lend additional 
insight into the effects of competition. 
 Private schools are routinely subjected to market forces that TPSs generally do 
not face.  Similar to charter schools, private schools rely on attracting students to remain 
in business.  Many have posited that this could create a competition effect in which 
private school competition would force inefficient schools out of business and/or cause 
TPSs to raise school quality and improve student achievement in particular.  These 
studies typically use the percentage of students would attend a private school in a 
particular area as the relevant measure private school competition.  Following the 
literature, we measure private school competition as the share of elementary and 
secondary students attending private schools in teachers’ MSA.  Formally, the measure is 
given by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 = �𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 �𝑚𝑚 
26 Eight states do not have any current charter law.  They are: Alabama, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
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where m denotes MSA.  The numerator is simply the total student enrollment in private 
schools within MSAs, and the denominator is the total number of TPS, charter school, 
and private school enrollment. 
The extent to which private school competition spurs TPSs to improve quality 
relies on the demand for private schooling.  Demand is largely driven by the costs 
associated with parents exercising some form of public-private choice and the quality of 
local public schools.  The primary cost to parents of private school choice comes mainly 
in the form of tuition.  This is in addition to resources that parents must continue to 
contribute to public schools through property taxes.  Private school choice is likely to be 
weak where the relative cost of exercising choice is high, and for low-income families, 
this may mean that private schools are not feasible alternatives, even if private schools 
better satisfy parents’ preferences for schooling.  The existing quality of public schools 
also plays an important role in the demand for private schooling.  Areas where TPSs are 
weak would likely see a higher demand for private schools and areas with strong TPSs 
would likely have a lower demand for private schooling.  It is reasonable to use the share 
of private school enrollment to measure private school competition so long as we include 
socioeconomic characteristics of MSAs to account for omitted variable bias and 
instrument for the private market share using credible instruments to correct for the 
correlation between public school quality and private school competition. 
3.4 Estimation 
 The empirical strategy seeks to distinguish the effect of competition on the 
organization of teaching jobs in public schools.  By organization of teaching jobs, we are 
referring to the way in which teachers are paid and the characteristics, skills, and 
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attributes that teachers accumulate.  We include our measure of Tiebout competition, 
charter competition, and private school competition in all empirical analyses that follows 
as outlined in Chapters 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.27  Furthermore, since competition could well 
have very different effects depending on the incentive structure and organizational 
mission of the school in which teachers work, we also explore competition’s effect on the 
pay and characteristics of teachers working in TPS and charter schools independently by 
estimating separate equations for charter teachers and TPS teachers.  Thus, we estimate 
equations (1) and (2) as described below three times each.  Once for all teachers 
combined, once for charter teachers alone, and once for TPS teachers, including the 
measures of competition in each.  The empirical strategy can be summarized by two 
reduced-form equations.28  The first is a basic wage equation given by: 
(1) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽5 + 𝑿𝑿𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽6 + 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 
where i indexes individual teachers and m indexes MSAs.  The variable Tm is the index of 
Tiebout competition, the variable Cm is the share of MSA charter enrollment, the variable 
Pm is the MSA share of students attending private schools, Iim is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a teacher works in a charter school and 0 if a teacher works in a TPS to help 
control for differences in pay arising due to difference in the school-setting, Xim is a 
vector of individual teacher characteristics that controls for things like education and 
experience which likely affects teachers’ pay, Xm  is a vector of MSA characteristics, εm is 
a grouped error term since teachers are clustered by MSA and many of the key 
27 The Appendix supplies regression results using alternative measures of competition.  These results are 
very similar to those presented in the text. 
28 Equations (1) and (2) show the baseline model for all teachers.  The model changes only in that the 
indicator variable for charter or TPS teacher drops out when estimating effects for charter and TPS teachers 
separately.  
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independent variables depend mainly on variation among MSAs, and εim is an individual-
specific error term.  Lastly, the dependent variable, ln(Wim), is the natural log of all 
school-related pay for teacher i working in MSA m.29 
The second part of the empirical strategy involves estimating the effect of Tiebout 
competition, charter competition, and private school competition on the characteristics, 
skills, and attributes of teachers.  Other than the dependent variable, equation (2) differs 
from equation (1) only in that it excludes the vector of individual teacher characteristics 
(Xim) since we are trying to discern the effect of competition on many of the individual 
teacher characteristics contained in Xim.  The characteristic equation is as follows: 
(2) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 =  𝛼𝛼0  +  𝛼𝛼1𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚  +  𝛼𝛼2𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚  +  𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚  + 𝛼𝛼4𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚  +  𝑿𝑿𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼5  +  𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚  +  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 
where i denotes teachers and m denotes MSAs.  The vector Xm  is the same exact set of 
MSA characteristics as in (1), vm is a grouped error term, and vim is an individual-specific 
error term.  All remaining independent variables retain the same interpretation as in the 
wage equation.  Lastly, the dependent variable, teacher characteristic (y) includes 
variables such as Master’s degree, regular state certification, and so on. 
The coefficients of primary interest in equations (1) and (2) are β1 and 𝛼𝛼1which 
return the effect of Tiebout competition on teacher pay and teacher characteristics, 
respectively, and β2 and 𝛼𝛼2 which yield charter competition’s effect on teacher pay and 
the characteristics of teachers.  The vector Xm is included in each equation and contains a 
set of MSA market characteristics intended to control for influences other than the supply 
of competition that might affect teacher pay or the characteristics, skills, and attributes of 
29 Equation (1) also includes indicator variables for school-year. 
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teachers.  For example, teachers working in MSAs with a higher average household 
income may be more likely to pay teachers higher wages regardless of the amount of 
competition within teachers’ MSA if the cost of living is higher, or MSAs with a 
population having a higher average educational attainment may desire teachers with 
certain characteristics, like more math and science skills or more tech skills, more so than 
MSAs with a less educated population.  Therefore, including market characteristics in 
equations (1) and (2) helps eliminate bias arising from omitted determinants affecting the 
demand for certain teachers and that are possibly correlated with the supply of 
competition.  However, while Xm controls for many observed determinants, there may be 
other, unobserved, influences that are correlated with the Tiebout competition, charter 
competition, and private school competition. 
Hoxby (2000) and Hoxby (2002) argues that measures of Tiebout competition 
based on district enrollment shares are likely endogenous to school productivity.  That is, 
MSAs having a disproportionate number of unsuccessful schools also have a greater 
number of districts.  The reasoning goes as follows.  An MSA having little Tiebout 
competition is probably due to either there having always been a single district that has 
monopolized the MSA or it is the result of district consolidation.30  If the latter is true, 
then MSAs with more Tiebout competition have more observed Tiebout competition 
because productive districts with successful schools declined to consolidate with 
unproductive districts that have many unsuccessful schools.31  If this is indeed the case, 
30 See Kenny and Schmidt (1994) for a discussion regarding school district consolidation.  They underscore 
the decline in public districts over the decades across states. 
31 Furthermore, Hoxby argues parents will want to send their children to successful schools in productive 
districts, which will cause them to “switch” out of unproductive districts with unsuccessful schools.  For 
example, households with school-aged children moving from a central city school district to a suburban 
school district.  Either implies the amount of Tiebout competition is endogenously determined by school 
productivity. 
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OLS will produce estimates of 𝛽𝛽1and 𝛼𝛼1that are biased, inconsistent, and probably not 
representative of the true effects of Tiebout competition.  Similarly, OLS will likely yield 
false estimate of the effects of charter competition.  It has been well-established that the 
location decision of charter schools is non-random. Charter schools tend to locate in more 
urban areas, areas high in poverty and with more minorities, and areas where they are 
more likely to succeed in general.  Therefore, unobservable factors that affect charter 
school conduct, like school quality, are likely to bias estimates of 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛼𝛼2.  Finally, 
estimates of the effects or private school competition will likewise be biased under 
simple OLS estimation of equations (1) and (2) since public school quality and the 
private market share are inversely correlated.  Specifically, there is concern that parents 
choose private schools in areas where public school quality is low. 
We rectify these endogeneity issues by employing a Two-Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) estimation approach.  This requires that, for each endogenous competition 
variable included in the analysis, we have a set of instrumental variables that are 
correlated with the competition measure and do not have an independent effect on either 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚) or yim.  Formally, the variables Tm, Cm, and Pm are all supposed endogenous in 
equations (1) and (2).  That is, E[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚|𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚] ≠ 0, E[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚|𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚] ≠ 0, and E[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚|𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚] 
≠ 0.  Then given a set of exogenous determinants of each endogenous competition 
variable, we can obtain a solution in two stages.  The first-stage is: 
(3) 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚  =  𝜋𝜋0 +  𝑹𝑹𝑚𝑚𝜋𝜋1  +  𝑿𝑿𝑚𝑚𝜋𝜋2  +  𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚 
 
(4) 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 =  𝛿𝛿0  +  𝑳𝑳𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿1   +  𝑿𝑿𝑚𝑚𝛿𝛿2   +  𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚  
(5) 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 =  𝜙𝜙0  +  𝑫𝑫𝑚𝑚𝜙𝜙1   +  𝑿𝑿𝑚𝑚𝜙𝜙2   +  𝜔𝜔𝑚𝑚 
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where Rm is a vector of instruments that satisfy E[𝑢𝑢 m   |Rm] = 0 and Cor[Rm ,Tm] ≠ 0, Lm is 
a vector of instrument that satisfy E[θm |Lm] = 0 and Cor[Lm ,Cm] ≠ 0, and Dm is a vector 
of instruments satisfying E[𝜔𝜔 m   |Dm] = 0 and Cor[Dm , Pm] ≠ 0, among other conditions 
that satisfy properties of good instruments.  We can then use the vector of variables given 
by [Rm , Lm , Dm, Xm] as a set of credible instruments to obtain 2SLS estimates by 
substituting in the predicted values from each first-stage regression of equations (3), (4) , 
and (5) in place of the actual values directly into equations (1) and (2) above and then re-
estimating equations (1) and (2) via OLS.  In particular, we obtain 𝑇𝑇�𝑚𝑚 using the set of 
instruments given by [Rm , Xm] from the OLS estimation of equation (3) in which the 
dependent variable is the endogenous index of Tiebout competition (Tm), where Rm is a 
vector of variables that measure the number of large rivers and small streams in teachers’ 
MSA and Xm is a vector of MSA market characteristics.  Similarly, we obtain ?̃?𝐶𝑚𝑚 from 
the estimation of equation (4) in which now the dependent variable is the likely 
endogenous share of MSA charter enrollment (Cm) and using the set of instruments [Lm , 
Xm], where Lm is a vector of variables containing a measure of the strength of state 
charter laws and number of years elapsed since the charter law was first passed and Xm is 
the same vector of MSA market characteristics used throughout the analysis.  And lastly 
we use the set of instruments [Dm , Xm] to obtain the fitted values 𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚 from the OLS 
estimation of equation (5) in which the dependent variable is the endogenous MSA 
private school enrollment market share and Dm is a vector of church membership 
densities and Xm is the same vector of market characteristics of teachers’ MSA.  So long 
as the vector of instruments, [Rm , Lm , Dm, Xm], is correlated with the endogenous 
variables in question and does not independently affect teacher pay or teacher 
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characteristics, then OLS will yield consistent estimates of the effects of interest in this 
two-stage procedure.32 
 
 
  
32 Standard errors must be corrected in the 2nd stage using this two-step methodology for proper inference.  
We additionally correct the standard errors to account for clustering by MSA in the 2nd stage. 
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4 Data 
4.1 Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
The empirical strategy outlined in Chapter 3 requires data on individual public 
school teachers, data on charter school enrollment and TPS enrollment, private schooling, 
and characteristics of the education market in which teachers work.  Additionally, since 
the index of Tiebout competition in teachers’ MSA, share of MSA charter school 
enrollment, and fraction of MSA private school enrollment are all likely endogenous, we 
also require information on a set of variables that are correlated with the endogenous 
competition variables and uncorrelated with the error terms in equation (1) and equation 
(2).  We propose using rivers and streams, state charter laws, and religiosity, respectively, 
as instruments for Tiebout competition, charter competition, and private school 
competition.  Several data sources are combined to meet these requirements, all matched 
by school-year where possible.  Finally, we restrict attention to MSAs, since our primary 
variables of interest, namely Tiebout competition and the share of MSA charter school 
enrollment, are available primarily at the MSA-level.  The remainder of this chapter 
begins by describing the various data sources, followed by a discussion of Summary 
statistics for variables used throughout the analysis, and concludes by describing the 
methodology used to merge charter teachers and TPS teachers to MSAs. 
4.1.1 SASS 
Data on charter and TPS teachers come from the restricted-use version of the 
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS).  The SASS is a stratified random sample of public 
and private schools and school teachers administered by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) beginning in the mid-1980’s and continuing approximately 
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every 3-4 years thereafter.  Beginning with the 1999-00 wave, the SASS first began 
including charter schools in its sampling frame.  Since charter schools make up only a 
small fraction of the total number of public schools sampled, we pool each wave of the 
SASS that includes charter schools in its sampling frame in order to maximize the total 
number of charter school teacher observations.  Thus, we pool the four most recent waves 
of the SASS for the 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08, and 2011-12 school-years.  The 1999-00 
SASS consists of 42,086 TPS teachers and 2,847 charter teachers.  For the 2003-04 wave, 
42,073 TPS teachers and 1,171 charter teachers were sampled by the SASS.  The 2007-
08 edition of the SASS sampled 37,003 TPS teachers and 1,237 charter school teachers.  
Finally, the 2011-12 SASS sampled 34,956 TPS teachers, along with 2,541 charter 
teachers.  Pooling each wave of the SASS results in a total combined sample of 163,914 
public school teachers, including 156,118 TPS teachers and 7,796 charter teachers.  After 
matching teachers to MSAs, and removing teachers with missing earnings data and other 
pertinent information, we are left with a final combined sample of 96,796 public school 
teachers, including 91,306 TPS teachers and 5,490 charter teachers, across 357 MSAs.33  
The vector Xim in equation (1) contains individual teacher variables derived from the 
SASS and used throughout the analysis, and only variables common to all four years are 
contained in Xim.  These variables include:  Master’s degree or better; years of teaching 
experience and its square; an indicator for having previously taught in private schools; an 
indicator for beginning teachers (those with 1-3 years of experience); an indicator 
variable for secondary school teachers; an indicator variable for special education 
teachers; an indicator for teachers possessing a standard state certification; an indicator 
variable for belonging to a teachers’ union or similar employees’ association; and a 
33 Matching teachers to MSAs is detailed below. 
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binary variable for the demographic make-up of teachers, including female, black, and 
Hispanic.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for variables contained in the vector Xim in 
equation (1) and also the variables used as the dependent variable in equation (2).  As 
illustrated by the table, charter teachers and TPS teachers tend to have very different 
demographics, credentials, education, experience, and pay.  Charter teachers are about 
5.5 years of age younger than TPS teachers.  A slightly larger fraction of charter teachers 
are female, although the mean is approaching 70% for both charter and TPS teachers.  
Charters tend to have a larger share of minority teachers relative to TPSs; 13% of charter 
teachers identify as black or African-American and 9.5% as Hispanic compared to only 
7.5% of TPS teachers identifying as black or African-American and 5.2%  Hispanic.  In 
addition, fewer charter teachers teach traditional high school grades, and fewer charter 
teachers teach special education.  Only 34.4% of charter teachers teach in grades 9-12 
and only 6.4% of charters are assigned to teach special education, while almost 47% of 
TPS teachers teach grades 9-12 only and 12% of TPS teachers teach special education.  A 
higher share of charter teachers have taught in a private school at some point in their 
teaching career relative to TPS teachers, with the difference in means more than 4 
percentage points.  Fewer charter teachers have a regular state certification.  Only 65% of 
charter teachers are state certified compared to 89% of TPS teachers having obtained 
their state certification.  Charter teachers are also far less unionized relative to TPS 
teachers, with 22.8% of charter teachers belonging to a union or similar employees’ 
association compared to almost 77% of TPS teachers.   
55 
  
Charter schools and TPSs also appear to employ teachers with very different 
education attainment and experience levels.  The share of charter teachers with only a 
Bachelor’s degree greatly exceeds the share of TPS teachers with  a Bachelor’s only—
nearly 61% of charter teachers have only a Bachelor’s compared to just 46% of TPS 
teachers.  In examining the type of Bachelor degree earned by teachers, TPS teachers 
have a very large share of teachers with a Bachelor’s degree in an education field 
awarded through their college or university’s Department of Education.  The mean is 
over 70%.  The share of charter teachers with an education degree drops to a just over 
50%.  Little difference exists between the share of charter teachers and TPS teachers 
receiving a degree in a math or science field, but charter teachers have a higher share of 
teachers having received a degree in a field outside their college or university’s 
Department of Education relative to TPS teachers by about 11 percentage points.  
Additionally, and as implied by the sample means for Bachelor’s degree, TPS teachers 
have a much higher percentage of teachers with a Master’s degree or better compared to 
charter teachers.  Over 52% of TPS teachers have a Master’s degree, while the share of 
charter teachers with a Master’s degree drops to 36%.  Charter teachers are also less 
experienced than TPS teachers.  TPS teachers have an average of 14 years of teaching 
experience compared to only 7.25 years for charter teachers.  This is due, at least in part, 
to charter teachers being an average of over 5 years younger than TPS teachers.  Also, as 
demonstrated in Table 1, charter teachers have a much larger share of teachers who are 
beginning teachers, while TPS teachers have a substantially larger share of teachers who 
are highly experienced.  The mean number of teachers with 1-3 years of experience is 
nearly 38% for charters and only 16% for TPS teachers.  On the other hand, the share of 
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highly experienced teachers (20+ years of experience) is less than 9% for charter teachers 
and almost 30% for TPS teachers.  The majority of teachers sampled have an experience-
level between 4-19 years.  The share for both charter and TPS teachers is over 50%.  
Finally, large differences in pay exist between charter teachers and TPS teachers.  The 
mean base salary for charter teachers is only $38,400, while base pay for TPS teachers is 
a little over $46,000.  Examining all school-related earnings, which includes merit and 
incentive pay, bonus pay, and pay for coaching and other extra-circular activities, TPS 
teachers earn an average of over $8,000 more than charter school teachers. 
4.1.2 CCD 
 Data on schools and school districts are obtained from the NCES’s Common Core 
of Data (CCD).  The CCD annually collects administrative data on the universe of U.S. 
public schools and school districts.  Data collected includes enrollment at both the 
district-level and school-level for grades K-12 and comparable ungraded grades, county 
location, and the type of public school (charter, TPS).  We primarily use information on 
school enrollment provided by the CCD’s Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe 
Survey for the purpose of constructing a measure of the amount of Tiebout competition in 
teachers’ MSA.  Recall, Tiebout competition is based on a Herfindahl index based on 
district enrollment shares of total MSA enrollment in TPSs.  Since Tiebout is based on 
district enrollment shares, it measures the amount of inter-district competition, or 
fragmentation among districts.  The index is bounded between 0 and 1, with a value of 0 
corresponding to minimal or no competition (monopoly district) in an MSA and a value 
of 1 corresponding to maximal competition (perfect competition) among MSA districts.  
Additionally, since the CCD includes enrollment data for charter schools, we also use the 
57 
  
CCD to calculate our measures of charter school competition—the share of total MSA 
student enrollment in charter schools.  Since our sample of public school teachers 
consists of teachers for the 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08, and 2011-12 school-years, we 
calculate the index of Tiebout competition and the MSA share of charter enrollment for 
each year corresponding to the sample of teachers.  Therefore, both Tiebout competition 
and the share of MSA charter enrollment vary by MSA and school-year.  Since the share 
of MSA charter enrollment is a function of TPS enrollment and private school 
enrollment, in addition to charter enrollment, discussion of summary statistics will be 
reserved for the sub-section that immediately follows.     
4.1.3 PSS 
Data on private elementary and secondary schools come from the Private School 
Universe Survey (PSS).  The PSS is conducted biannually by the NCES and provides an 
assortment of administrative data for every private school in the 50 U.S. states, including 
religious orientation, county, state, and MSA in which schools are physically located, 
school-level, and enrollment in grades K-12 and comparable ungraded students.  Since 
our sample covers multiple school-years, we draw on the 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08, and 
2011-12 editions of the PSS for the primarily purposes of constructing the share of MSA 
private school enrollment.  We calculate the private share as total MSA private 
enrollment over the sum of MSA private enrollment, charter enrollment, and TPS 
enrollment,   The share of MSA private enrollment varies, as with Tiebout competition 
and the share of MSA charter enrollment, both across MSA and across school-year.   
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the share of MSA enrollment in private 
schools, share of MSA enrollment in charter schools, and the index of Tiebout 
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competition.  For the sample combined, roughly 9% of all MSA K-12 enrollment is in 
private schools.  Every MSA contains at least one private school, with the share of 
private enrollment reaching a maximum of nearly 31% and a minimum of 0.2%.  In 
addition, the mean share of MSA private enrollment is 8.3%, 9.0%, 9.5%, and 9.6% for 
the 2011-12, 2007-08, 2003-04, and 1999-00 school-years, respectively, seemingly 
indicating enrollment in private schools, at least across MSAs, appears to be trending 
downward.  Perhaps not so coincidently, the share of MSA charter enrollment has 
increased more than 5-fold during this same timeframe.  Overall, the mean share of MSA 
charter enrollment for all 4 school-years combined is only 2%.  However, for 2011-12, 
the share of MSA charter enrollment had reached a high of nearly 4% of all K-12 
enrollment, up from just a 0.7% market share in 1999-00.  Additionally, the share of 
MSA charter enrollment hit a maximum of only 10% in 1999-00, and jumped all the way 
to a maximum of over 31% by 2011-12.  Thus, simple Summary statistics seemingly 
suggest the share of MSA charter enrollment is becoming an important share of all school 
enrollment.  Finally, Summary statistics for the measure of district fragmentation, 
Tiebout competition, indicate the amount of inter-district competition among districts has 
remained about the same over the years.  For the 2011-12, 2007-08, 2003-04, and 1999-
00 school-years, the mean amount of Tiebout competition is 0.807, 0.781, 0.778, 0.792, 
and for all 4 years combined, the Tiebout competition measure has a mean of 
approximately 0.800.  This means the average MSA in the sample has about 5 equally-
sized school districts.  However, some MSAs have many more districts, like Boston MA 
which has over 70 districts, corresponding to a high degree of Tiebout competition, and 
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some MSAs have much fewer districts, like Miami FL, which has only 1 district, 
corresponding to a very little amount of Tiebout competition.    
4.1.4 PEP, SAIPE, BLS, and Census 2000 
 In order to isolate the effects of our primary variables of interest, Tiebout 
competition and the share of MSA charter school enrollment on the school-related 
earnings of teachers—as well as on our teacher characteristic equation—it is important to 
control for characteristics of the MSA in which teachers work since the distribution of 
characteristics is likely to vary across teachers’ MSA.  For example, MSA’s with a higher 
average household income could reasonably be expected to pay teachers higher wages 
regardless of the amount of competition within teachers’ MSA, or MSAs with a land area 
with more square miles may reasonably be expected to have a greater number of districts 
included in teachers’ MSA.  Failing to control for such things could cause our estimates 
to over-state or under-state the true effect of competition if these things are, in fact, 
correlated with our measures of competition or have an independent effect on teacher 
pay.  To control for the potential of omitted variable bias, we employ an array of data 
from the Census Bureau’s Population Estimates Program (PEP), the Census Bureau’s 
Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), and the Census 2000 to control for difference in teacher pay and other teacher 
characteristics arising due to differences in the distribution of MSA characteristics in 
which teachers work and eliminate any omitted variable bias.  These variables are 
contained in the vector Xm in equations (1) and (2), and include the following variables:  
the log of population; the log of land area, log of average household income; the Gini 
coefficient of household income; the fraction of the population age 19 and under;  the 
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fraction of the population age 65 and over; the fraction of population who are Hispanic; 
the fraction of the population who are black; the fraction of the population age 25 and 
over with a bachelor’s degree or higher; the fraction of the population age 25 and over 
with a high school degree only; the unemployment rate; and the fraction of the population 
17 and under in poverty.  All data are at the MSA-level and matched by school-year 
where possible.34 
Table 3 contains summary statistics for the set of MSA-level variables drawn 
from the various data sources and used as explanatory variables in all regressions that 
follow.  As illustrated by the table, charter teachers can be found in 175 MSAs, while 
TPS teachers are spread across all 357 MSAs included in the analysis.  Also, charter 
teachers tend to work in MSAs with both a larger population base and a larger land area.  
The average household income of the MSA in which charter teachers works is slightly 
larger than that of TPS teachers, probably due, in part, to charter teachers working in 
larger, more densely populated MSAs.  In addition, charter teachers work in MSAs with a 
higher share of the population age 25+ who are Hispanic, yet there is virtually no 
difference in the mean share of the population age 25+ who are black for the MSAs 
charter teachers work in and the MSAs TPS teachers work in.  Little difference exists 
between the age distribution of MSAs in which charter and TPS teachers work, and few 
differences arise in the education distribution between MSAs in which charter teachers 
work and TPS teachers work.  MSAs in which charter teachers work have a slightly 
higher unemployment rate of 6% compared to only 5.6% for MSAs in which TPS 
34 Census 2000 data can be matched to MSAs, but not school-year.  These variables include: average 
household income, the Gini coefficient of household income, fraction of population age 25+ with a 
Bachelor’s, and fraction of population age 25+ with a high school degree only.  All remaining data are 
matched by MSA and school-year. 
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teachers work.  Finally, both charter teachers and TPS teachers tend to work in MSAs 
with an average poverty-level for children 17 and under of around 4.5%.   
4.1.5 GNIS 
 Data on rivers and streams are obtained from the U.S. Geological Survey’s 
Geographic Names Information System (GNIS).  The GNIS is a comprehensive database 
containing information on all current and historical physical geographic features within 
the U.S., excluding roads and highways.  The GNIS uniquely identifies all rivers and 
streams, as well as provides information on every county and state through which rivers 
and streams flow and the source and destination latitude and longitude coordinates of 
rivers and streams.  These data are used to calculate the total distance rivers and streams 
flow and to disaggregate total MSA rivers into large rivers and small streams.35  We thus 
use the count of large rivers and small streams to produce 2SLS estimates of the effects 
of Tiebout competition to eliminate endogeneity concerns arising from OLS.  This 
follows the methodology proposed by Hoxby (2000).  She argues that the observed 
amount of Tiebout competition is endogenous to school productivity, and areas with a 
greater amount of Tiebout competition could potentially be the result of an endogenously 
larger number of districts with unsuccessful schools.  Since, historically, rivers and 
streams and other physical features were natural determinants of school district 
boundaries, Hoxby argues that physical features, such as rivers and streams, can act as 
credible instruments since they are correlated with the number of school districts and 
uncorrelated with school productivity.  While fundamentally, Hoxby’s argument is valid, 
others have questioned her methodology.  Specifically, the way in which she constructs 
her large rivers and small streams variables has been well-scrutinized.  Therefore, we 
35 Following Hoxby (2000) large streams are those longer than 3.5 miles. 
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adopt Rothstein’s (2011) alternative definition of larger rivers and smaller streams in our 
analysis.  Rothstein counts MSA rivers and streams by flow rather than by destination, 
which eliminates the problem of losing rivers like the Mississippi River, which empties 
into a non-MSA county despite following through several large MSAs.  Moreover, we 
adopt the number of inter-county rivers as large rivers and define the number of small 
rivers as the number of intra-county rivers since we do not have data on river and stream 
width, which Hoxby incorporates into her definition of large streams.  Although crude 
measures for the variation of interest, as argued by Rothstein, these measures should also 
act as credible instruments. 
4.1.6 CER 
 Data on state charter school laws comes from the Center for Education Reform.  
The CER is a non-profit organization that strongly advocates for school choice and, in 
particular, charter schools.  In the mid-1990’s, the CER began ranking state charter laws 
based on certain provisions contained within states’ charter law that make for a more 
favorable environment for the formation, sustainability, and success of charter schools.  
We draw on the CER’s ranking of state charter laws for the years matching our sample of 
teachers for the 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08, and 2011-12 school-years.36  For each year, 
the CER rated the same 10 provisions of states’ charter law on a 0-5 point scale, with a 5 
indicating that the provision is particularly favorable to the success of charter schools and 
a 0 indicating that the provision is unfavorable to the success of charter schools.  We use 
the CER’s aggregate score on the 10 provisions, as a percentage of the maximum, as an 
36 Data are obtained from the CER’s annual report, “Charter School Laws Across the States:  Rankings and 
Scorecard” for each school-year corresponding to the sample of teachers. 
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instrument for the share of MSA charter enrollment.37  The charter law strength ranges 
between 0 and 1, with values close to 1 implying that a state has strong charter laws that 
are favorable to the formation and success of charter schools, and values close to or equal 
to 0 indicating a state has weak laws (or no laws) that are not favorable to the formation 
and success of charter schools.  In addition to charter laws, we also use the number of 
years since the charter law was first passed into state law as a second instrument.   
4.1.7 CCM 
 Data on religious composition are drawn from the 1952 Survey of Churches and 
Church Membership Study (CCM).38  The CCM periodically collected county-level 
church and church membership information on many Christian and Jewish denominations 
in the U.S. beginning in 1952 and continuing through 1980.  Data on historical church 
membership are used to construct church membership densities for 10 major 
denominations within the U.S., and the densities are in turn used to obtain instrumental 
variable (2SLS) estimates of the private school enrollment MSA market share in 
equations (1) and (2) since the private market share has been well-documented as 
endogenous to public school quality.  That is, in areas where private enrollment is high, 
TPS quality is likely to be low, and vice versa.  Hoxby (1994) and Hoxby (2002), among 
others, proposes using religious composition as instruments since a large portion of 
private schools have a religious affiliation, and it is generally less costly to provide 
denominational schooling in areas with a higher share of that denomination. In particular, 
it is argued that historical church membership is exogenous since this was a time in 
37 Post 2007-08, the CER introduced a new ranking scale for states’ charter law.  It appears certain 
provisions were merged to create a single provision; thus, reducing the number of provisions ranked from 
10 to 7.  We, therefore, use the aggregate law score, as a percentage of the maximum, rather than each of 
the 10 provisions as separate instruments. 
38 CCM survey data are obtained from The Association of Religious Data Archives, or ARDA. 
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which donor bases and endowments for denominational schooling were first established, 
allowing current tuition costs to be reduced or partially subsidized.  Areas with a larger 
donor base likely have more places to offer at lower costs. The 10 major church 
membership densities derived from the data and used in all instrumental variables 
regressions that follow are:  Catholic, Mormon, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, 
Episcopalian, Lutheran, Disciples of Christ, and the Christian Church.  Table 4 contains 
summary statistics for each set of instruments used to obtain 2SLS estimates of the 
effects of competition.   
4.2 Matching Teachers to MSAs 
We equate education markets with Metropolitan Statistical Areas.  MSAs are 
defined as geographic entities containing at least one urbanized cluster of 50,000 or more 
population, and consist of one or more whole counties containing the urban core plus 
adjacent counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with the urban 
core.  The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the federal agency 
responsible for issuing the standards that define MSAs.  Our analysis relies on the June 
2003 standard as set forth by the OMB, which designated 1,090 counties and the District 
of Columbia as belonging to an MSA.  In total, the OMB designated 362 MSAs across 
the 50 U.S. states. 39   To facilitate matching teachers to MSAs, we first construct an 
intermediate dataset containing all 362 MSAs and their associated counties.  It is 
important to note that MSAs consist of whole counties, and no one county can span 
multiple MSAs.  Therefore, we can uniquely match up counties with their respective 
39 These standards were first published by the OMB on December 27, 2000, and supersede the 1990 
standards for defining Metropolitan Areas.   
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MSA.  Therefore, this creates a crosswalk of sorts between MSAs and counties (MSA-
county crosswalk).     
 Several intermediate datasets are created to facilitate matching all the various data 
to MSAs.  We begin by creating a dataset that acts as a crosswalk between districts and 
MSAs to aid in merging teachers to the MSA in which they work.  We draw on the 
CCD’s Local Education Agency Universe Data (district) file for this purpose since the 
CCD provides a complete accounting of every public school district known to exist in the 
U.S..  From the CCD’s district file, we are supplied with a variable that uniquely 
identifies each school district (LEAID) and a variable that corresponds to the county of 
physical location (CONUM) for each school district observed.  We then use the CCD’s 
designation of school districts to counties to uniquely match school districts to MSAs 
based on the OMB’s June 2003 assignment of counties to MSAs.40  Thus, we create an 
intermediate dataset (LEAID-MSA crosswalk) that contains a variable that uniquely 
identifies school districts and a variable that identifies the MSA corresponding to the 
county of physical location of each district. 
We then use the LEAID-MSA crosswalk to assign charter teachers and TPS 
teachers in the SASS to MSAs.  The restricted-use version of the SASS permits users to 
merge teacher-level data with their accompanying school-level and district-level data 
files for the sample of teachers included in the SASS.  Merging teachers with their 
respective school-level and/or district-level data file allows users to obtain a unique 
district identification number (CCDIDLEA) for the district  in which teachers in the 
SASS work.  The district identification number (CCDIDLEA) supplied by the SASS is 
40 This is accomplished using the intermediate dataset, MSA-county crosswalk, which contains all 362 
MSAs and their associated counties.   
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identical to the district identification number (LEAID) supplied by the CCD.  This allows 
one to uniquely match teachers to their respective district file from the CCD.  Therefore, 
we are able to match teachers to MSAs by merging teachers in the SASS with their 
school-level and/or district-level data file provided by the SASS in order to obtain their 
unique district id number (CCDIDLEA), and then using CCDIDLEA to merge teachers 
to MSAs using the LEAID-MSA crosswalk since CCDIDLEA = LEAID.41   
Using the outlined procedure to match teachers to MSAs, a total of 67,174 teacher 
observations were lost.  Table 5 provides a breakdown of the number of teacher 
observations lost and the reason for their loss.  As indicated by the table, we lose over 
55,000 teachers whose school district is not part of an MSA based on the methodology 
described above.  In addition, due to the data requirements, we lose Alaska and Hawaii 
due to missing data on church membership since neither Alaska nor Hawaii had achieved 
statehood by 1950.42  Teachers not teaching grades K-12 or comparable ungraded grades 
are also excluded from the sample, as are teachers who are not regular, full-time teachers.   
This results in another 9,006 and 138 teachers falling out of the sample, respectively.  
Additionally, one MSA did not have information on private schooling for 1999; one 
MSA did not have data on church membership; and one MSA did not have rivers and 
streams information available.  MSAs missing these data result in another 76 teachers 
being dropped.  Finally, 18 teachers fall out of sample due to missing information on 
earnings. 
 
41 Because the 1999-00 SASS did not provide an id (CCDIDLEA) for charter schools, we use zip-codes 
corresponding to charter schools provided by SASS to assign charter schools to counties.  We then assign 
charter teachers to MSAs based on the county corresponding to the zip-code for the charter school in which 
they work.  Zip-codes spanning multiple MSAs are dropped.   
42 Alaska and Hawaii also are missing data on rivers and streams. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics, SASS Teachers 
 
 All  
Teachers 
 Charter 
Teachers 
 TPS   
Teachers 
   
   Variables Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
         Charter teacher 0.057 0.231 
 
--- --- 
 
--- --- 
         Base earnings (1000s) 45.62 14.50 
 
38.39 11.69 
 
46.05 14.54 
All school earnings (1000s) 47.18 15.06 
 
39.35 12.28 
 
47.65 15.08 
         Teaches grades 9-12 0.461 0.499 
 
0.344 0.475 
 
0.469 0.499 
Taught at private school 0.094 0.292 
 
0.136 0.343 
 
0.092 0.289 
Regular state certification 0.875 0.331 
 
0.654 0.476 
 
0.888 0.315 
Union 0.736 0.441 
 
0.228 0.420 
 
0.767 0.423 
         
Age (yrs.) 42.10 11.30 
 
36.95 11.07 
 
42.41 11.24 
Female 0.680 0.467 
 
0.699 0.459 
 
0.679 0.467 
Black 0.078 0.268 
 
0.133 0.340 
 
0.075 0.263 
Hispanic 0.054 0.227 
 
0.095 0.293 
 
0.052 0.222 
         
Less than Bachelor's degree 0.019 0.137 
 
0.029 0.167 
 
0.019 0.135 
Bachelor's degree only 0.467 0.499 
 
0.611 0.488 
 
0.459 0.498 
Master's degree 0.514 0.500 
 
0.360 0.480 
 
0.523 0.499 
         Bachelor's degree field: 
        Education 0.706 0.456 
 
0.588 0.492 
 
0.713 0.452 
Math 0.022 0.146 
 
0.026 0.158 
 
0.022 0.146 
Science 0.047 0.211 
 
0.054 0.226 
 
0.047 0.211 
Other 0.226 0.418 
 
0.334 0.472 
 
0.220 0.414 
         Teaching experience (yrs.) 13.66 10.09 
 
7.25 7.48 
 
14.05 10.10 
         Years of Experience: 
        1-3  0.172 0.377 
 
0.395 0.489 
 
0.158 0.365 
4-19 0.542 0.498 
 
0.523 0.500 
 
0.543 0.498 
20+  0.287 0.452 
 
0.082 0.274 
 
0.299 0.458 
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Table 1:  (Continued): 
         
Main teaching assignment: 
        Special education 0.120 0.325 
 
0.064 0.245 
 
0.124 0.329 
Math 0.113 0.317 
 
0.124 0.330 
 
0.112 0.316 
Science 0.091 0.288 
 
0.092 0.290 
 
0.091 0.288 
Other 0.675 0.468 
 
0.719 0.449 
 
0.673 0.469 
         Year = 1999-00 0.268 0.443 
 
0.374 0.484 
 
0.261 0.439 
Year = 2003-04 0.259 0.438 
 
0.152 0.359 
 
0.265 0.441 
Year = 2007-08 0.226 0.418 
 
0.150 0.358 
 
0.230 0.421 
Year = 2011-12 0.248 0.432 
 
0.323 0.468 
 
0.243 0.429 
 MSAs represented 357 
 
175 
 
357 
N 96,796 
 
5,490 
 
91,306 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Source:  Schools and Staffing Survey.  Summary statistics are for teachers working in 
MSAs based on OMB's June 2003 standard. 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics, Measures of Competition 
 
  MSAs Mean S.D. Min. Max.      
 
All School-Years Combined: 
             
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
357 0.789 0.219 0.000 0.985 
Charter school Herfindahl 
 
357 0.551 0.427 0.000 0.992 
Private school Herfindahl 
 
357 0.937 0.087 0.309 0.999 
Charter enrollment share 
 
357 0.020 0.027 0.000 0.313 
Private enrollment share 
 
357 0.091 0.043 0.002 0.314 
N = 96,796 
      
       2011-12 School-Year: 
             
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
350 0.807 0.214 0.000 0.985 
Charter school Herfindahl 
 
350 0.676 0.397 0.000 0.992 
Private school Herfindahl 
 
350 0.937 0.090 0.309 0.998 
Charter enrollment share 
 
350 0.038 0.037 0.000 0.313 
Private enrollment share 
 
350 0.083 0.040 0.005 0.294 
N = 24,002 
      
       2007-08 School-Year: 
             
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
350 0.781 0.231 0.000 0.985 
Charter school Herfindahl 
 
350 0.603 0.410 0.000 0.991 
Private school Herfindahl 
 
350 0.933 0.090 0.353 0.999 
Charter enrollment share 
 
350 0.022 0.025 0.000 0.129 
Private enrollment share 
 
350 0.090 0.042 0.007 0.310 
N = 21,859 
      
       2003-04 School-Year: 
             
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
351 0.778 0.225 0.000 0.983 
Charter school Herfindahl 
 
351 0.517 0.421 0.000 0.992 
Private school Herfindahl 
 
351 0.938 0.085 0.386 0.999 
Charter enrollment share 
 
351 0.013 0.018 0.000 0.128 
Private enrollment share 
 
351 0.095 0.045 0.002 0.253 
N = 25,036 
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Table 2: (Continued) 
       1999-00 School-Year: 
             
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
353 0.792 0.205 0.000 0.982 
Charter school Herfindahl 
 
353 0.425 0.433 0.000 0.984 
Private school Herfindahl 
 
353 0.941 0.083 0.391 0.999 
Charter enrollment share 
 
353 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.100 
Private enrollment share 
 
353 0.096 0.045 0.013 0.314 
N = 25,899             
 
Source: 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08, and 2011-12 Common Core of Data.  Includes 
only those MSAs with teacher observations. 
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Table 3:  Mean Characteristics, MSAs 
 
Variables  All Charter TPS 
   
   Population (1000's) 2,699.3 3,688.3 2,639.9 
   Log (population) 13.892 14.525 13.854 
   Land area (square miles) 4,593.6 5,972.0 4,510.7 
   Log (land area) 8.117 8.397 8.100 
   Average HH Income (1000s) 56.0 59.1 55.8 
   Log (average HH income) 10.916 10.976 10.912 
   Gini coefficient of HH income 0.420 0.421 0.420 
   % of population age 19 and under 0.280 0.282 0.280 
   % of population age 65 and over 0.121 0.120 0.121 
   % of population Hispanic 0.124 0.180 0.121 
   % of population black or African-American 0.119 0.116 0.119 
   % of population 25+ with a Bachelor’s or better 0.258 0.266 0.257 
   % of population 25+ with a HS diploma only 0.279 0.260 0.280 
   % of population 17 and under in poverty 0.044 0.046 0.044 
   Unemployment rate 0.056 0.060 0.056 
 Census Division: 
Population in New England Census Division 0.088 0.046 0.091 
Population in Mid-Atlantic Census Division 0.085 0.084 0.085 
Population in East North Central Census Division 0.124 0.196 0.120 
Population in West North Central Census Division 0.111 0.042 0.115 
Population in South Atlantic Census Division 0.166 0.162 0.166 
Population in East South Central Census Division 0.071 0.001 0.075 
Population in West South Central Census Division 0.110 0.097 0.111 
Population in Mountain Census Division 0.136 0.211 0.132 
    Population in Pacific Census Division 0.108 0.162 0.105 
    N 96,796 5,490 91,306 
MSAs represented 357 175 357 
 Notes:  The table contains means of each MSA characteristics used as explanatory 
variables in all regressions.  Data are from the Census 2000, BLS, PEP, and SAIPE. 
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Table 4:  Summary Statistics, Instruments 
 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Panel A:  Tiebout Competition Instruments 
      # of large rivers 
 
52.5 43.5 
   # of small streams 
 
140.8 148.6 
 Panel B:  Charter Competition Instruments 
      Charter law score (%) 
 
0.497 0.281 
   Years since law passed 
 
8.9 5.9 
    Panel C:  Private School Competition Instruments 
      Density, Catholic Church 
 
30.5 70.7 
   Density, Mormon Church 
 
0.6 3.6 
   Density, Jewish Church 
 
3.6 22.4 
   Density, Baptist Church 
 
1.5 2.9 
   Density, Methodist Church 
 
8.6 8.4 
   Density, Episcopal Church 
 
2.7 6.4 
   Density, Presbyterian Church 
 
3.2 5.4 
   Density, Lutheran Church 
 
5.9 11.6 
   Density, Christian Church 
 
2.5 5.8 
   Density, United Church of Christ 
 
1.5 2.5 
   
Notes:  Means and Standard Deviations are at the MSA-level.  Statistics for charter law 
score is out of the maximum law score possible (50).  Church membership densities are 
the number of adherents per square mile.  
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Table 5:  Teacher Observations Lost and Reason for Observation Lost 
 
Observations Lost  Reason for Loss 
 55,504 School is not part of MSA 
2,369 Teachers in AK and HI 
9,006 Not full time 
138 Teaches pre-K only 
28 Missing private school enrollment (Logan UT MSA) 
23 Missing church membership (Carson City, NV MSA) 
33 Missing rivers and streams (Midland, TX MSA) 
18 Missing school-related earnings 
   
Notes:  The total number of combined teacher observations for the 1999-00, 2003-
04, 2007-08, and 2011-12 editions of the Schools and Staffing Survey are 163,960.  
After merging teachers to MSAs, and removing teachers for reasons described  
above, the number of remaining teacher observations is 96,796 charter and TPS 
teachers,.  In addition, for the 4 school-years combined, 46 MSAs do not contain 
any teacher observations.  This includes 10 for the 1999-00 school-year, 13 for  
2003-04, 14 for 2007-08, and 9 for the 2011-12.  For the sample combined, 357 out 
of a possible 362 MSAs are represented in at least one school-year.    
  
74 
  
5 Wage Equation Results 
Table 6 presents estimates and standard errors from the estimation of equation 
(1)—the natural log of all school-related pay on our key competition variables (index of 
Tiebout competition, share of MSA charter school enrollment, and private school market 
share), individual teacher characteristics, and characteristics of the MSA in which 
teachers work.43  Baseline OLS regression results are presented in columns (1) – (3) of 
the table.  Furthermore, since each of the three measures of competition is likely 
correlated with the error term in equation (1), we also obtain 2SLS estimates and standard 
errors.  These can be found in columns (4) – (6) of the same table.  Additionally, since 
competition may affect teachers differently depending on the type of institution in which 
a teacher works, separate results for charter teachers and traditional public school (TPS) 
teachers are presented in the table.  Finally, given that teacher observations are limited to 
MSAs only, and several of the independent variables in equation (1) vary only by MSA, 
teacher observations within MSAs are likely correlated.  Therefore, standard errors have 
been adjusted to reflect clustering by MSA.44 
5.1 OLS 
 Before turning to the effect of competition on pay, it is useful to first examine 
how individual teacher characteristics affect teacher pay.  Recall, equation (1) contains a 
vector of teacher characteristics, skills, and other attributes that help eliminate any 
differences in pay attributable to differences in the make-up of teachers.  Examining the 
rows associated with these teacher characteristics in Table 6 shows that many teacher 
43 All regressions also include indicator variables for the 9 census divisions and indicator variables for 
school-year. 
44 Teacher observations are likely correlated within district as well.  Estimates obtained when clustering by 
district are present in the Appendix.  Results are very similar when clustering by MSA presented below. 
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characteristics have a highly significant effect on the pay received by teachers.  For 
example, teacher pay in TPSs has historically been a function of educational attainment 
and years of teaching experience as determined by the single salary schedule of the 
school district in which teachers work.  As would be expected, Table 6 indicates both 
education and experience have a positive and highly significant relationship with pay for 
all teachers, with the effects slightly larger for TPS teachers.  TPS teachers with a 
Master’s degree earn, on average, 11.6% higher pay compared to teachers with a 
Bachelor’s degree or less, while Charter teachers with a Master’s earn around 9.8% more.  
Experience exhibits a diminishing effect on pay for both TPS and charter teachers.  A 
single year of experience is worth 3% for TPS teachers and 2.52% for charter teachers, 
with the second year of experience being worth slightly less at 2.91% for TPS teachers 
and 2.43% for charter teachers, and each subsequent year seeing slightly lower returns to 
experience.45   
In addition to education and experience, it appears many of the other 
characteristics, skills, and attributes that teachers accumulate over their career factors into 
the pay decision of schools and school district, with many significant at the 1% level of 
significance and non-trivial in size.  Public school teachers having previously taught in a 
private school receive lesser pay, on average, of about 3.2% compared to teachers having 
never taught in private schools.  Charter schools appear to value private school teaching 
experience far less than TPS teachers, with charter teachers receiving upwards of an 
average of 6.5% lower pay and TPS teachers receiving about 3% lesser pay.  These 
results could suggest that public schools value teachers with greater familiarity and 
45 When experience reach slightly more than 32 year for TPS teachers and slightly less than 28 years for 
Charter teachers, the returns to experience reaches 0. 
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experience in dealing with the challenges of working in the public school environment, 
especially since many public schools are subject to high-stakes testing and accountability 
reforms that private schools are exempted from.  Grade-level taught also appears to affect 
pay substantially.  Secondary school teachers earn an average of more than 2.4% more 
than elementary school teachers.  Charter teachers working in secondary schools are paid 
even more, earning over 5% higher pay than charters in elementary schools.  This could 
support the notion that secondary grade students are inherently more difficult to teach 
relative to elementary grade students, or it could reflect greater specialization on the part 
of high school teachers, particularly since high school teachers typically teach a specific 
subject-matter that requires more advanced training in and deeper knowledge of the 
subject-matter, such as math or science.  State certification likewise has a highly 
significant effect on pay, especially for charter teachers.  Charter teachers with a regular 
state certification earn 3.7% more compared to those not having a regular certification, 
while state certified TPS teachers receive only about half that of charter teachers.  To the 
extent that schools are able to hire teachers that are not fully certified on a temporary 
basis or for a probationary period contingent upon completing certification requirements 
for full employment status, it is plausible to believe that these teachers would receive 
lower pay until they meet this requirement and receive their regular state certification.  
Union status likewise plays a significant role in teacher pay.  Teachers that belong to a 
teachers’ union or a similar employees’ association receive an average pay boost of 
roughly 3.4% compared to teachers not union affiliated, with charter teacher receiving the 
biggest boost at over 6.6% compared to just 3% for TPS teachers.46  This finding could 
46 Some states, such as Florida, mandate by law that charter teachers belonging to a union receive union 
negotiated pay.  This is one reason why unionization may be associated with higher pay for charters. 
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be suggestive of the ability of teachers’ unions to negotiate better working conditions and 
higher salaries for its members.  While all teachers would probably experience the benefit 
of union negotiated better working conditions (e.g., fewer working hours, reduced class 
size, etc.), it is likely that only those teachers belonging to the teachers’ union itself 
would experience the full benefit of union membership and higher pay.  Lastly, the 
demographic make-up of public school teachers appears to make little difference in 
regards to pay, with the unexpected exception of gender.  Female teachers are found to 
receive over 4% less pay relative to their male counterpart, with the pay gap narrowing to 
2.64% in charter schools.  This result is hard to explain given one of the stated goals of 
the single salary schedule was to eliminate gender bias in pay.47  However, it is in line 
with much recent research and media attention on gender pay disparities across industry 
and within occupation. 
Of primary interest is the effect of competition on the organization of teaching 
jobs in public schools, and, in particular, competition’s effect on wages.  We thus enter 
measures of Tiebout competition, charter competition, and private school competition 
into equation (1).  Column (1) shows results for all teachers combined in a single 
equation, while columns (2) and (3) show results for charter and TPS teachers separately.  
For all teachers combined, column (1) indicates a positive relationship exists between 
Tiebout competition and teacher pay.  Changing the probability that, in a random 
encounter between two students in the same MSA, the two students would be enrolled in 
TPSs in different school districts from 0 to 1 sees pay rise by an average of 3.4%.  While 
increasing the amount of Tiebout competition from a single monopoly school district 
47 One possible explanation for male teachers earning higher pay is that male teachers often receive 
additional pay for higher-paying extracurricular activities, such as coaching a sport. 
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provider to a perfectly competitive market is not very plausible, the average MSA has a 
mean amount of Tiebout competition equal to roughly 3 school districts.48  This implies 
that teachers in MSAs with the mean amount of Tiebout competition earn about 2.3% 
higher wages.  The effect is slightly stronger for TPS teachers, with these teachers 
earning about 2.5% more in MSAs with the average amount of Tiebout competition.  On 
the other hand, raising the amount of Tiebout competition appears to make charter 
teachers worse off through lower pay, with charter teachers working in MSAs with the 
mean Tiebout competition receiving about 2.2% less pay.  However, for charter teachers, 
the effect is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance.  
Columns (1) – (3) also indicate that charter competition, as measured by the share of 
MSA enrollment in charter schools, has no discernable effects on pay for TPS teachers or 
charter teachers..  However, if we consider the point estimates irrespective of 
significance, it would seem that, if anything, raising the MSA charter share would work 
to raise pay for TPS teachers and reduce pay for charter teachers.  Lastly, column (1) 
indicates, as expected, charter teachers receive lower pay compared to their TPS 
counterparts by approximately 7%. 
5.2 2SLS 
The above analysis demonstrates the potential benefit of Tiebout competition, 
particularly for TPS teachers.  As previously discussed, however, OLS estimates of 
Tiebout competition’s effect is likely confounded by endogeneity issues arising from 
measures based on district enrollment shares.  Moreover, it is likely that the included 
measure of charter competition is also endogenous since charter schools tend to locate in 
48 This value corresponds to mean MSA statistics not weighted by teachers per MSA and are available from 
the author upon request. 
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areas where parents may be dissatisfied with local schools and they are more likely to 
succeed in general, and the private market share is likewise endogenous to public school 
quality.  If Tiebout competition, charter competition, and private school competition are 
indeed endogenous, then OLS estimates of competition’s effects are biased, inconsistent, 
and not very likely to be representative of the true effects of competition.  We turn to a 
2SLS approach to remedy potential endogeneity issues and identify the true effects of 
Tiebout competition and charter competition as detailed in Chapter 3.   
5.2.1 First-Stage Results 
Before turning to the 2SLS estimates, it is important to first discuss first-stage 
regression results for each endogenous competition variable.  Identification of the true 
effect of competition relies on exogeneity of the instruments selected and that the 
instruments selected are correlated with the endogenous competition variable in question.  
Table 7 contains estimates and standard errors for the first-stage regression for each 
endogenous variable included in equation (1).49  Panel A shows results for the regression 
of endogenous Tiebout competition on the excluded instruments, large rivers and small 
streams.  As column (1) of Panel A indicates, both rivers variables are positive and 
statistically significantly correlated with the index of Tiebout competition based on 
district enrollment shares.  However, the large rivers variable has a much stronger 
independent effect on Tiebout competition than the small streams variable, and it is 
significant at the 1% level.  The small streams variable is significant at only 10%.  For 
both large rivers and small streams, the estimated relationship with Tiebout competition 
suggests that an increase in the number of MSA rivers and streams raises the probability 
49 Table 7 also includes first-stage results for regressions specifying alternative versions of the competition 
measures.  Second-stage results for these regressions can be found in the Appendix. 
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that in a random meeting between students from the same MSA, they would be enrolled 
in TPSs located in different school districts.  In addition to independently having 
predictive power, large rivers and small streams are also jointly different from zero.  The 
F-statistic is 21.30, and the associated p-value for the probability of observing a greater 
F-statistic is 0.0000. 
Turning to the first-stage regressions for charter competition, the excluded 
instruments are the strength of states’ charter law and the number of years since states’ 
charter law first passed into state law.  Panel B of Table 7 indicates that there is a strong, 
positive, and highly statistically significant relationship between the share of MSA 
charter enrollment and each excluded instrument.  For the strength of charter law, a 1% 
increase in the CER’s score of a state’s charter law is associated with a 1.8% rise in the 
share of MSA charter enrollment.  Likewise, our second excluded instrument, years since 
the charter law was implemented, has a positive relationship with charter competition, 
and implies that, on average, a 10-year increase in the number of years since the charter 
law first entered into state law translates into a 1.3% increase in the MSA share of charter 
school enrollment.  Each effect is independently statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Additionally, the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are jointly zero is soundly 
rejected given a p-value equal to 0.0000 for the probability of observing a greater F-
statistic than that observed. 
Panel C of Table 7 shows the relationship between the 10 church membership 
densities as excluded instruments and the private school enrollment market share.  
Particularly important is the Catholic density, since a large share of private schools are 
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affiliated with the Catholic Church.50  As would be expected, the Catholic density is 
positive and statistically significantly related to the share of private enrollment.  On 
average, holding all else constant, MSAs with a higher number of Catholic Church 
members per square mile see the share of MSA private school enrollment rise.  Several of 
the other church membership densities are also statistically significant, mostly at the 1% 
level, and they are all negatively associated with the share of private enrollment.  The F-
statistic for the joint significance of the 10 church membership densities is 23.64 and the 
associated p-value is 0.0000.  Thus, the 10 densities are jointly different from zero at the 
1% level of significance. 
Panels A-C of Table 7 indicate that the selected sets of instruments are potentially 
credible instruments in that they have an independent effect on the endogenous variable 
in question and are jointly significant.  Thus, the first condition, that the instruments be 
correlated with the potentially endogenous competition variable, has been met.  The 
second condition, that the instruments are exogenous, is more difficult to corroborate, but 
it’s hard to see how the set of instruments might have an independent effect on wages.  
Moreover, with the exception of the excluded instruments for the share of MSA charter 
enrollment, all instruments have been accepted in other studies on teacher pay and/or 
student achievement as credible instruments.  In addition, in studies questioning the 
validity of results based on instrumental variables that use some of the same instruments 
used in this analysis—namely, large rivers and small streams—critics question the 
researcher’s methodology in parsing rivers into large rivers and small streams and not 
necessarily the validity of the instruments as exogenous.  In addition, we follow 
50 Approximately 24% of all private schools are affiliated with the Catholic Church (Source: Private 
Schools Universe Survey, 2011-12). 
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Rothstein (2011) in parsing large rivers and small streams directly from the GNIS 
database based on length only rather than Hoxby’s (2000) preferred method which hand 
counts large streams directly from the USGS’s 1/24,000 quadrangle maps according to 
width and length.  The former methodology introduces less decision-making and human 
error into the classification of large rivers and small streams that received much heated 
debate. 
5.2.2 Second-Stage Results 
Table 6 contains 2SLS estimates from the regression of the log of all school-
related pay on the key competition variables, along with a host of other MSA-level and 
individual teacher-level explanatory variables in order to isolate the effects of 
competition.51,52  The 2SLS results contained in the table are directly comparable to OLS 
results previously noted and also contained in the same table.  The first row of columns 
(4) – (6) shows how Tiebout competition affects public school teachers when treating 
Tiebout competition as endogenous.  In particular, column (4) indicates that the 2SLS 
estimate of the effect of Tiebout competition on all teachers combined increases 
dramatically as compared to OLS estimates obtained in column (1).   The effect is now 
nearly 8 times larger in size, and it continues to be statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels of significance.  Similarly, for TPS teachers, column (6) indicates a 
7-fold increase in the magnitude of the effect of Tiebout competition.  On average, for 
TPS teachers, a change in the number of large rivers and small streams in MSAs that 
51 Care should be taken when interpreting 2SLS results presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  Griliches (1977) 
discusses how correcting one problem using an instrumental variable approach actually exacerbates other 
problems, leading to substantial bias in instrumental variable estimates. 
52 Ideally, one would include an MSA or state fixed effect in the analysis to eliminate any time-invariant 
things, such as state regulations, that might influence estimates.  However, since we analyze MSAs only, a 
large number of observations are lost since some states have only 1 MSA.   
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generates an increase in the index of Tiebout competition from 0 to 1 raises teacher pay 
by over 24%.  Moreover, for TPS teachers working in the average MSA, this translates 
into a pay increase of a little less than 17%.  For charter teachers, although still 
insignificant, the effect of Tiebout competition on pay, as shown in column (5), also 
indicates a dramatic rise in wages.  Whereas under OLS the effect was negative 3%, 
2SLS estimates indicate that the actual effect could be closer to positive 18%.  These 
results seemingly suggest that once any potential confounding influences are eliminated, 
Tiebout competition substantially raises pay, at least for TPS teachers.  Furthermore, 
point estimates tend to indicate a positive association between Tiebout competition and 
pay for charter teachers, though the effect is too imprecisely measured to be significant at 
conventional levels.   
Turning to charter school competition, as measured by the share of MSA 
enrollment in charter schools, columns (4) and (6) of Table 6 reveal a substantial increase 
in charter competition’s effect on wages over that obtained under OLS and contained in 
columns (1) and (3).  Whereas all OLS estimates are insignificant, 2SLS estimates of the 
effect of charter competition are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance.  For TPS teachers, a change in charter law strength and the number of years 
since the charter law passed into state law that yields an increase in the share of MSA 
charter enrollment equal to the mean generates an increase in pay of approximately 4%.  
For charter teachers, although still insignificant, the point estimate in column (5) tends to 
suggest that raising the share of MSA charter enrollment could also potentially benefit 
charter teachers through higher pay.  This result contrast OLS estimates which signal a 
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negative relationship.  However, the standard errors are again too large to confer 
statistical significance. 
These results as a whole illustrate the importance of accounting for endogeneity 
concerns when examining the relationship between pay and both Tiebout competition and 
charter competition.  Many of the previously insignificant relationships produced under 
OLS estimation become statistically significant when estimated using 2SLS techniques.  
Comparing naïve OLS estimates to 2SLS estimates in columns (1) – (6) of Table 6 also 
reveals the direction of the resulting bias.  For both Tiebout competition and the share of 
MSA enrollment in charter schools, OLS estimates are biased toward finding no 
significant effect.  This result is largely consistent with similar studies finding biases 
toward zero.  Additionally, the magnitude of the effects of competition on pay are 
generally similar for both TPS teachers and charter teachers, although 2SLS estimates are 
by and large too imprecisely estimated to be significant for charter teachers.  This could 
be due, at least in part, to the relatively small sample of charter teachers.  Finally, these 
results are consistent with a story in which school districts behave as a monopsony buyer 
of teacher services.53  Under this scenario, increased competition causes teacher pay to 
rise as the market power of school districts is reduced and school districts can no longer 
hold wages below market value as competition bids wages up. 
5.3 School Characteristics 
 One might worry that differences in the characteristics of schools or districts 
might lead to a compensating differential of sorts since some schools and school districts 
might offer other, non-pecuniary things that teachers might prefer.  For example, some 
53 This is particularly relevant given the pay of charter schools and private schools, two of the primary 
competitors to school districts, offer wages below that of school districts. 
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schools might offer teachers reduced class sizes, teachers might have more or better 
classroom resources at their disposal at certain schools, or a school might be located in a 
more desirable neighborhood.  Teachers might well be inclined to take lesser pay if these 
non-pecuniary things are important to them in order to work at such schools.   On the 
other hand, if certain schools are perceived as undesirable from the standpoint of 
teachers, schools may be forced to pay teachers a wage premium to work at these 
schools.  Examples could include schools that are located in high crime neighborhoods, 
schools that have been reprimanded for poor performance, or schools that have a 
relatively large number of students with disciplinary problems.  Therefore, we re-estimate 
equation (1) via OLS and 2SLS and include school characteristics as explanatory 
variables to control for compensating differentials that might arise due to differences in 
the quality of schools in which teachers work.  
We explore the impact of school characteristics on teacher pay by first estimating 
equation (1) when excluding all measures of competition and including only school and 
teacher characteristics.  As can be seen in columns (1) – (3) of Table 8, many school 
characteristics independently have a statistically significantly effect on teacher pay in the 
absence of the competition measures.  It appears that both charter teachers and TPS 
teachers are paid more for working in schools with a higher share of minority students.  
TPS teachers working in schools with a higher share of both black or African-American 
students and Hispanic students receive a wage boost, with both effects significant at the 
1% level and the effect about twice as large for teachers working in schools with a higher 
share of black or African-American students. Only the school share of Hispanic students 
significantly affects the pay that charter teachers receive, with a 1% increase in the share 
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of a school’s student population that is Hispanic leading to 5% higher wages.  Also, the 
school share of students approved for free lunch appears to actually reduce pay for TPS 
teachers, while it has no effect on charter teachers.  For TPS teachers, a 1% increase in 
the share of students free lunch approved in the teacher’s school is associated with about 
5% lower pay, on average.  Finally, while the fraction of student with an Individual 
Education Plan (IEP) has no effect on pay, the share of students in teachers’ school that 
are Limited English Proficient (LEP) leads to about 7% higher pay for both charter and 
TPS teachers with both effects significant at 5% or better. 
Table 8 also shows results for regressions that include the index of Tiebout 
competition and the share of MSA charter enrollment, while also including school 
characteristics to control for possible differences among schools.  As seen in columns (4) 
– (6), most of the school characteristics remain statistically significant and similar in 
magnitude even after adding in the competition measures.  Particularly interesting, 
however, are the measures of competition and whether controlling for any compensating 
differential might mitigate or even eliminate any wage effect resulting from an increase 
in competition.  OLS estimates found in these same columns remain consistent with 
previous OLS estimates when excluding school characteristics (Table 6, columns (1) – 
(3)).  If anything the wage effect has risen slightly in magnitude, but remains the same in 
terms of statistical significance.  However, as noted earlier, OLS estimates are biased, 
inconsistent, and not representative of the true effect of Tiebout competition or the MSA 
share of charter enrollment since they are likely endogenous.  Therefore, columns (7) – 
(9) show regression results for specifications that include school characteristics, the 
competition measures, and that correct for possible endogeneity issues.  By and large, 
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2SLS estimates found in these columns are consistent with 2SLS results when excluding 
school characteristics in sign, magnitude, and significance for each regression.  If 
anything, for TPS teachers, adding school characteristics to control for differences among 
schools slightly strengthens the effect of Tiebout competition on teacher pay, and 
marginally lessens the impact of the share of MSA charter enrollment on wages.  
Therefore, while differences among schools may lead to pay differentials among 
teachers, it appears competition still results in a significant wage effect, especially for 
TPS teachers.
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Table 6:  Wage Equation Regressions   
 
            
     
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A:  Regression Results 
           Index of Tiebout competition 
 
0.0344 -0.0336 0.0369 
 
0.2434 0.1833 0.2466 
  
(0.0111)*** (0.0426) (0.0116)*** (0.1126)** (0.1795) (0.1120)** 
   Charter enrollment share 
 
0.1345 -0.2101 0.1934 
 
2.0278 0.7017 1.9586 
  
(0.1173) (0.1902) (0.1294) 
 
(0.4385)*** (1.8455) (0.4353)*** 
   Charter teacher 
 
-0.0693 
   
-0.0731 
  
  
(0.0071)*** 
  
(0.0077)*** 
    Private enrollment share 
 
-0.1812 0.2886 -0.2108 
 
0.2370 0.4188 0.2329 
  
(0.0817)** (0.1479)* (0.0833)** 
 
(0.4767) (0.9372) (0.4802) 
   Master's 
 
0.1158 0.0978 0.1160 
 
0.1156 0.0981 0.1158 
  
(0.0024)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0026)*** 
   Experience 
 
0.0298 0.0252 0.0300 
 
0.0298 0.0249 0.0300 
  
(0.0004)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0004)*** 
   Experience-squared 
 
-0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 
-0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
  
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
   Taught at private school 
 
-0.0327 -0.0654 -0.0290 
 
-0.0338 -0.0654 -0.0303 
  
(0.0021)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0022)*** (0.0023)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0024)*** 
   1 – 3 years experience 
 
0.0040 -0.0040 0.0023 
 
0.0042 -0.0042 0.0024 
  
(0.0028) (0.0090) (0.0029) 
 
(0.0030) (0.0090) (0.0030) 
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   Teaches grades 9 – 12  
 
0.0247 0.0502 0.0241 
 
0.0240 0.0515 0.0233 
  
(0.0020)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0023)*** (0.0085)*** (0.0023)*** 
   Special education 
 
-0.0095 -0.0006 -0.0099 
 
-0.0102 0.0010 -0.0106 
  
(0.0018)*** (0.0119) (0.0018)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0120) (0.0020)*** 
   Certified 
 
0.0204 0.0369 0.0185 
 
0.0203 0.0375 0.0184 
  
(0.0028)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0028)*** 
   Female 
 
-0.0419 -0.0264 -0.0427 
 
-0.0419 -0.0264 -0.0427 
  
(0.0015)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0015)*** 
   Hispanic 
 
0.0000 -0.0155 0.0024 
 
-0.0001 -0.0140 0.0019 
  
(0.0035) (0.0107) (0.0035) 
 
(0.0045) (0.0111) (0.0044) 
   Black 
 
0.0051 0.0007 0.0063 
 
0.0063 0.0014 0.0073 
  
(0.0050) (0.0099) (0.0051) 
 
(0.0047) (0.0101) (0.0049) 
   Union 
 
0.0340 0.0658 0.0302 
 
0.0342 0.0647 0.0306 
  
(0.0025)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0033)*** 
   Constant 
 
6.5633 8.2019 6.4770 
 
7.4870 8.3816 7.4248 
   (0.3775)*** (0.9252)*** (0.3855)*** (0.7217)*** (1.4659)*** (0.7121)*** 
        
Panel B:  Regression Statistics 
           R2 
 
0.6744 0.5950 0.6749 
       Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96,796 5,485 91,306   96,796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the log of all school-related earnings.  Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis.  MSA 
characteristics, year indicators, and census division indicator variables are included as additional explanatory variables in all 
regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
  
Table 7:  First-Stage Regression Results 
 
Panel A:  Regression of Tiebout Competition on Excluded Instruments 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Tiebout 
Competition 
Index 
 
Tiebout 
Competition 
Index (Total 
Enrollment) 
Tiebout 
Competition 
Index 
   
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
   # large streams (100s) 0.0773 0.0613 0.0773 
 
(0.0205)*** (0.0174)*** (0.0205)*** 
   # small streams (100s) 0.0112 0.0091 0.0112 
 
(0.0059)* (0.0050)* (0.0059)* 
         R-squared 0.5247 0.5277 0.5247 
   F(2,1378) 21.20 18.80 21.20 
   P-value, all excluded instruments 
jointly equal zero 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1,404 1,404 1,404 
Panel B:  Regression of Charter Competition on Excluded Instruments 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Charter 
Enrollment 
Share 
Charter 
Enrollment 
Share 
Charter 
Enrollment 
Herfindahl    
 (1) (2) (3) 
   Charter law score (%)  0.0180 0.0180 0.3673 
 
(0.0029)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0347)*** 
   # years since law passed 0.0013 0.0013 0.0138 
 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0022)*** 
         R-squared 0.4103 0.4103 0.6167 
   F(2,1378) 93.55 93.55 160.12 
   P-value, all excluded instruments 
jointly equal zero 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1,404 1,404 1,404 
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Table 7:  (Continued) 
 
Panel C:  Regressions of Private School Competition on Excluded Instruments 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Private 
Enrollment 
Share 
Private 
Enrollment 
Share 
Private 
Enrollment 
Herfindahl   
 (1) (2) (3) 
   Density, Catholic Church 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 
 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)* 
   Density, Mormon Church -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0012 
 
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0006)* 
   Density, Jewish Church -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009 
 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** 
   Density, Baptist Church -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0053 
 
(0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0013)*** 
   Density, Methodist Church -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0012 
 
(0.0001)* (0.0001)* (0.0004)*** 
   Density, Episcopal Church -0.0010 -0.0010 0.0011 
 
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0008) 
   Density, Presbyterian Church 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
   Density, Lutheran Church 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
   Density, Christian Church -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0026 
 
(0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0010)** 
   Density, United Church of Christ -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0017 
 
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0006)** 
          R-squared 0.5216 0.5216 0.5830 
   F(10,1370) 23.64 23.64 10.66 
   P-value, all excluded instruments 
jointly equal zero 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1,404 1,404 1,404 
Notes:  Each first-stage regression includes MSA characteristics, year indicators, and 
census division indicator variables as explanatory variables.  First-stage results shown 
in column (1) correspond to 2SLS regression results discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Estimates shown in columns (2) and (3) correspond to alternative 2SLS results found 
in the Appendix.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 8:  Wage Equation Regressions Including School Characteristics 
 
 
 OLS 2SLS 
 
 
School Characteristics Only 
School Characteristics and  
Competition Variables 
School Characteristics and  
Competition Variables 
 All Charter TPS All Charter TPS All Charter TPS 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A:  Regression Results 
Index of Tiebout comp. 
   
0.036 -0.014 0.038 0.257 0.243 0.261 
    
(0.011)** (0.041) (0.011)** (0.113)** (0.215) (0.113)** 
Charter enrollment share 
   
0.121 -0.175 0.174 1.958 1.965 1.883 
    
(0.115) (0.187) (0.129) (0.447)** (2.444) (0.444)** 
Private enrollment share 
   
-0.185 0.267 -0.212 0.276 0.493 0.274 
    
(0.082)** (0.158)* (0.084)** (0.486) (1.181) (0.497) 
Charter teacher -0.072 
  
-0.075 
  
-0.078 
  
 
(0.007)** 
  
(0.007)** 
  
(0.008)** 
  % school Hispanic 0.029 0.057 0.030 0.029 0.058 0.030 0.027 0.055 0.027 
 
(0.010)** (0.020)** (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.020)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.025)** (0.012)** 
% school black 0.047 0.016 0.059 0.048 0.015 0.059 0.049 0.021 0.060 
 
(0.008)** (0.020) (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.020) (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.025) (0.009)** 
% school free lunch -0.051 -0.002 -0.056 -0.051 -0.002 -0.055 -0.051 0.000 -0.056 
 
(0.004)** (0.016) (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.016) (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.019)** (0.005)** 
% school IEP 0.001 -0.018 0.002 0.004 -0.019 0.005 0.000 -0.013 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.024) (0.007) (0.006) (0.024) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.007) 
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% school LEP 0.073 0.069 0.070 0.073 0.068 0.069 0.073 0.074 0.070 
 
(0.012)** (0.030)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.029)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.032)** (0.015)** 
Master's 0.115 0.099 0.116 0.115 0.099 0.115 0.115 0.099 0.115 
 
(0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.008)** (0.002)** 
Experience 0.030 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.030 
 
(0.000)** (0.002)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.002)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.002)** (0.000)** 
Experience-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Taught private school -0.035 -0.064 -0.032 -0.034 -0.064 -0.031 -0.035 -0.064 -0.032 
 
(0.002)** (0.008)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.008)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.009)** (0.002)** 
1 – 3  years exp. 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) 
Teaches grades 9-12 0.022 0.053 0.021 0.023 0.051 0.022 0.022 0.053 0.021 
 
(0.002)** (0.008)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.008)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.009)** (0.002)** 
Special education -0.009 0.004 -0.010 -0.009 0.003 -0.010 -0.010 0.004 -0.010 
 
(0.001)** (0.012) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.012) (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.012) (0.002)** 
Certified 0.019 0.033 0.018 0.019 0.032 0.018 0.019 0.033 0.018 
 
(0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** 
Female -0.041 -0.026 -0.042 -0.041 -0.025 -0.042 -0.042 -0.025 -0.042 
 
(0.001)** (0.006)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.006)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.006)** (0.001)** 
Hispanic -0.003 -0.026 0.000 -0.002 -0.027 0.000 -0.002 -0.025 0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.010)** (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)** (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)** (0.004) 
Black -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) 
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Union 0.034 0.068 0.030 0.034 0.067 0.030 0.034 0.066 0.030 
 
(0.002)** (0.010)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.010)** (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.011)** (0.003)** 
Constant 6.929 7.979 6.874 6.671 8.328 6.585 7.628 8.724 7.566 
  (0.354)** (0.856)** (0.363)** (0.369)** (0.931)** (0.377)** (0.726)** (1.712)** (0.720)** 
Panel B:  Regression Statistics 
R2 0.6739 0.5976 0.6743 0.6747 0.5985 0.6753 
   Probability > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
# of MSAs 357 174 357 357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 90,187 5,050 85,132 90,187 5,050 85,132 90,187 5,050 85,132 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the log of all school-related earnings.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  MSA 
characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are also included as independent variables in all 
regressions.  The number of observations differs from Table 6 because schools missing information on school characteristics were 
dropped from the analysis.  ** significant at 5% or better, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
6 Characteristic Equation Results 
 Tables 9-15 present estimates and standard errors from the estimation of equation 
(2).  Recall, equation (2) differs from equation (1) only in that we now take a specific 
individual teacher characteristic, skill, or attribute as the dependent variable and therefore 
exclude the vector of individual teacher characteristics, Xim.  Similar as to the analysis of 
teacher pay, we first obtain baseline OLS estimation results and follow-up with a more 
rigorous 2SLS estimation procedure to account for the likely endogeneity of the index of 
Tiebout competition, share of MSA charter enrollment, and private school MSA market 
share.  All tables remain similar in structure to those found in Chapter 5, with columns 
(1) – (3) containing baseline OLS coefficient estimates and standard errors and columns 
(4) – (6) containing comparable 2SLS results.  First-stage regression results used to 
obtain 2SLS estimates and standard errors are the same as those previously discussed in 
Chapter 5 and found in column (1) of Table 7.  Standard errors that account for teachers 
clustering by MSA are in parenthesis in each table.54  
6.1 Master’s Degree 
 Table 9 presents regression results when taking Master’s degree as the dependent 
variable in equation (2), which equals 1 if a teacher has a Master’s and zero if not.  R-
squared for each regression in columns (1) – (3) is slightly above 0.042, implying that 
about 4.2% of the variation in Master’s degree is explained by the variation in the set of 
competition variables, characteristics of the MSA in which teachers work, census 
division indicators, and school-year dummy variables included as explanatory variables 
54 The Appendix shows results for alternative specification of our competition measures.  In particular, 
results in which an MSA-level charter enrollment Herfindahl is used in place of the share of MSA charter 
enrollment. Results obtained using the charter enrollment Herfindahl are nearly identical to those discussed 
below.  These results also include a private enrollment Herfindahl. 
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in the regressions.  Examining the coefficients, Tiebout competition appears to have little 
impact on the probability that teachers have a Master’s degree for each regression in 
columns (1) – (3).  Charter competition, as measure by the share of MSA charter school 
enrollment, likewise has few statistically significant results.  The exception is in column 
(2).  For charter teachers, raising the share of MSA charter enrollment is associated with 
a decrease in the probability of obtaining a Master’s degree.  Lastly, column (1) shows 
charter teachers are much less likely to have a Master’s degree compared to charter 
teachers.  Columns (4) – (6) return 2SLS estimates and standard errors.  Estimates shown 
in these columns illustrates that 2SLS strengthens the relationship between Tiebout 
competition and Master’s degree for TPS teachers.  The estimate on Tiebout has 
increased substantially.  Moreover, the estimated effect is now significant at the 10% 
level of significance.  For TPS teachers, raising the amount of Tiebout competition in 
teachers’ MSA raises the likelihood of teachers’ having a Master’s degree or better.  For 
charter teachers, column (5) illustrates few significant competition effects emerge.55 
6.2 Beginning Teacher 
 OLS and 2SLS estimation results for the regression of teachers with 1 – 3 years of 
teaching experience are presented in Table 10.  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a 
teacher has only 1 – 3 years of experience and 0 if they have more than 3 years of 
experience.  Column (1) shows OLS results for all teachers.  R-squared for the regression 
is 0.0276.  Although little variation is explained by the set of explanatory variables, the F-
statistic on the test that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero is 34.40, suggesting that 
the model is valid.  Additionally, the primary competition variables, Tiebout competition 
55 Some states, such as Kentucky, require teachers to have their Master’s within the first few years.  These 
results do not differ substantially from results on Master’s in which we examine teachers with 1-3 years of 
experience only. 
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and the share of MSA enrollment in charter schools, are jointly significant at the 10% 
level.  Moving along to the coefficients in columns (1) – (3), charter teachers have a 
considerably higher probability of only 1 – 3 years of experience, on average, compared 
to TPS teachers.  Also, OLS results suggest that raising the share of MSA charter 
enrollment reduces the share of beginning level teachers, and this result holds for TPS 
teachers as shown by column (3).  Tiebout competition, on the other hand, appears to 
make little difference in this probability for either charter teachers or TPS teachers in 
regards to beginning level teachers.  Columns (4) – (6) present second-stage results after 
taking steps to eliminate any potentially biasing influences.  As can be seen, any 
statistical significance among the competition variables is by and large eliminated.  For 
charter teachers, 2SLS point estimates in column (5) seem to indicate that more 
competition would actually lead to a reduction in the number of beginning teachers, 
which contrast OLS point estimates suggesting the opposite.  In neither case are results 
statistically significant at conventional levels, however.  Finally, column (4) indicates 
charters are much more likely to be beginning level teachers relative to their TPS 
counterparts, with the result significant at 1%. 
6.3 State Certification 
 Columns (1) – (3) of Table 11 present estimates from the OLS and 2SLS 
regression of teachers’ having regular state certification on the competition variables of 
interest and a host of other MSA-level explanatory variables.  R-squared for the 
regression runs from as little 0.0009 for TPS teachers to as high as 0.0990 for charter 
teachers.  For all teachers, R-squared is approximately 0.0373.  Column (1) shows 
regression results for all teachers, and indicates that charter teachers are significantly less 
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likely to have a regular state certification.  This result holds when moving to a 2SLS 
estimation strategy as shown in column (4).  Additionally, column (2) illustrates that 
neither the amount of Tiebout competition faced by districts nor the share of MSA charter 
enrollment significantly impacts charter teachers.  These results persist when moving to 
2SLS, as shown in column (5).  For TPS teachers, second-stage estimates shown in 
column (6) tend to indicate OLS estimates of competition’s effect on state certification 
are biased toward finding no effect.  The 2SLS estimates are much larger in absolute 
magnitude, and both Tiebout and the share of MSA enrollment become significant at 
conventional levels.  An increase in the amount of Tiebout competition in teachers’ MSA 
increases the likelihood of TPS teachers having a regular certification, while a rise in the 
share of MSA charter enrollment reduces the probability of TPS teachers holding a 
regular state certification.  The former result is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
and the latter is significant at 5%.   
6.4 Union Status 
 Table 12 shows results from both the OLS and 2SLS regression of teachers 
belonging to a union or similar employees’ association on the key competition variables.  
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if teachers belong to a union or similar employees’ 
association and zero otherwise.  Column (1) shows the regression for charter teachers and 
TPS teachers in a single equation.  R-squared for the regression is .2156, and the p-value 
for the probability all coefficients are zero is 0.0000.  As can be seen, charter teachers are 
far less likely to belong to a union or similar employees’ association compared to TPS 
teachers, with the result significant at the 1% level.  However, OLS results shown in 
columns (1) – (3) suggest competition has little significant effects on the union status of 
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public school teachers.  The table also presents results of 2SLS estimation.  Columns (4) 
– (6) appears to indicate moving from OLS to 2SLS strengthens the relationship between 
competition and union status.  For all teachers, the share of MSA charter enrollment is 
now positively associated with the likelihood teaches belong to a union or similar 
employees’ association, at the 10% level of significance, and column (4) also shows 
charter teachers are significantly less likely to be unionized.  For charter teachers alone, 
the share of MSA charter enrollment is not statistically significant, but the amount of 
Tiebout competition is found to actually raise the probability of unionization, and the 
result is statistically different from zero at the 5% level.  Lastly, for TPS teachers, column 
(6) indicates the share of MSA enrollment in charter schools, on average, reduces the 
probability of belonging to a union or similar employees’ association at the 10% 
significance level, while the amount of Tiebout competition does not statistically affect 
union status. 
6.5 Math Degree 
 Table 13 contains results for regressions in which the dependent variable is equal 
to one if a teachers has a Bachelor’s degree in math and zero if they received a 
Bachelor’s in another field from their college or university.56  Very little variation in the 
dependent variable in each regression is explained by the variation in Tiebout 
competition, share of MSA charter enrollment, and other MSA-level covariates as 
indicated by the low R-squared in columns (1) – (3).  However, the F-statistic on the null 
hypothesis that all explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is 9.04, with an 
associated p-value for the probability of observing a greater F-statistic equal to 0.0000.  
56 The dependent variable is equal to one if the teacher has a degree in a math field and the degree was 
awarded outside the school’s Department of Education. 
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Thus, we reject the null hypothesis, and conclude the model is valid.  Moving on to the 
estimates, few statistically significant results emerge in columns (1) – (3)., which show 
results for OLS.  However, 2SLS estimates found in columns (4) – (6) tell a much 
different story, and seem to suggest OLS understates the true effects of competition, 
particularly for TPS teachers.   An increase in Tiebout competition is associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of  TPS teachers possessing a Bachelor’s degree in a math field, 
and the result is significant at the 5% level.  Although not significant at conventional 
levels, the point estimate for the share of MSA enrollment in charter schools also 
suggests an increase in the likelihood of TPS teachers holding a math degree.  
Interestingly, the probability estimate switches sign from negative under OLS to positive 
when accounting for potential endogeneity issues biasing estimate of charter 
competition’s effect as seen in column (6).  For charter teachers and as shown in columns 
(2) and (5), neither OLS nor 2SLS estimation yield any significant competition effects.  
However, if point estimates are taken at face-value, Tiebout competition would raise the 
probability of a math degree for charter teachers, and the share of MSA charter 
enrollment would lower this probability.  Finally, no difference in math degree exists 
between TPS teachers and charter teachers, as indicated by OLS estimated coefficient 
found on charter teacher in column (1), and reaffirmed by 2SLS results shown in column 
(4).   
6.6 Teaches Secondary School Grades 
 Table 14 contains estimates and standards errors for regressions in which the 
dependent variable equals 1 if teachers only teach in secondary schools (grades 9-12) and 
zero otherwise.  R-squared for the OLS regression of the model including all teachers in a 
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single equation is 0.0107.  The F-statistic for the null hypothesis that all slopes equal zero 
is 7.79, which is reject at the 1% level of significance.  Column (1) indicates charter 
teachers, relative to TPS teachers, are less likely to teach only those grades associated 
traditional secondary school.  In addition, OLS results suggest the share of MSA charter 
enrollment increases the probability of  secondary school grades, for both charter teachers 
and TPS teachers, as shown in columns (2) and (3), respectively.  However, when turning 
to 2SLS, found in columns (5) and (6), despite increasing the magnitude of the effect for 
both charter and TPS teachers, the share of MSA charter enrollment loses statistical 
significance.  Additionally, estimates on the index of Tiebout competition become 
positive under a 2SLS regression scheme for both charter teachers and TPS teachers.  
However, in neither instance is Tiebout competition statistically significant.  Thus, it 
appears TPS teachers, overall, are more likely to be found in secondary schools relative 
to charter teachers, but neither the amount of Tiebout competition in teacher’s MSA nor 
the share of MSA enrollment in charter schools affects the prevalence of secondary 
school assignment for charter teachers or TPS teachers. 
6.7 Previously Taught in a Private School 
 OLS and 2SLS estimates for the regression in which the dependent variable is 
equal to 1 if a teacher has previously taught in a private school and zero otherwise is 
shown in columns (1) – (6) of Table 15.  For each regression, the p-value for the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero is 0.0000, implying that each 
regressions shown in columns (1) – (6) is significant at the 1% level of significance and 
valid.  Examining column (1), for all teachers combined, it appears that raising the 
amount of Tiebout competition reduces the likelihood of having previously taught in a 
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private school, and the result is significant at 10%.  Columns (2) and (3) show this result 
is largely driven by the sample of TPS teachers.  For TPS teachers, the amount of Tiebout 
competition within teachers’ MSA is negatively associated with the probability of having 
private school experience at the 5% level.  For charter teachers, column (2) indicates 
neither the amount of Tiebout competition nor share of MSA charter enrollment has 
much effect on having previously taught in a private school.  Moving on to the 2SLS 
estimates as shown in columns (4) – (6), the index of Tiebout competition loses statistical 
significance in each 2SLS regression.  It is worthy to note, however, that for both charter 
teachers and TPS teachers, the sign changes from OLS to 2SLS.  If anything it would 
appear that the amount of Tiebout competition raises the likelihood of having private 
school experience for TPS teachers and reduces the probability for charter teachers.  As 
under OLS, the share of MSA enrollment in charter schools has little statistical 
significance for the probability of having taught in a private school for any of our sample 
of teachers.  Lastly, column (4) indicates that charter teachers, relative to TPS teachers, 
are about 5% more likely to have taught at a private school at some point in their teaching 
career. 
  
103 
 104 
Table 9:  Master's Degree Regressions  
  OLS   2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition  0.0106 -0.0162 0.0128 0.2570 0.1089 0.2478 
  
(0.0199) (0.0629) (0.0206) (0.1312)** (0.4499) (0.1311)* 
Charter enrollment share 
 
-0.0697 -0.8734 -0.0342 0.1016 -6.7689 -0.0047 
  
(0.1579) (0.4899)* (0.1644) (1.4105) (7.6722) (1.3832) 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.1684 
  
0.0524 
  
  
(0.0125)*** 
  
(0.1031) 
  Private enrollment share 
 
-0.3121 0.2144 -0.3805 -0.1178 1.0639 -0.1477 
  
(0.1094)*** (0.2816) (0.1145)*** (0.2605) (1.0977) (0.2672) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
-0.0275 -0.2421 -0.0156 -0.0425 -0.2982 -0.0317 
  
(0.0148)* (0.0437)*** (0.0152) (0.0209)** (0.0897)*** (0.0214) 
Year = 2003-04 
 
-0.0304 -0.1627 -0.0224 -0.0402 -0.2166 -0.0334 
  
(0.0122)** (0.0325)*** (0.0126)* (0.0165)** (0.0771)*** (0.0168)** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
-0.0011 -0.1462 0.0060 -0.0176 -0.1751 -0.0108 
  
(0.0139) (0.0404)*** (0.0144) (0.0185) (0.0762)** (0.0189) 
Constant 
 
-1.5036 0.9568 -1.6862 -1.1240 2.0937 -1.2353 
  
(0.6840)** (1.5010) (0.7032)** (0.8709) (2.9608) (0.8694) 
        R2 
 
0.0461 0.0431 0.0423 
   Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 96.796 5,485 91,306 96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has a Master's degree and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as independent 
variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 10:  Beginning Teacher Regressions (1-3 Years of Experience) 
  OLS 
  
2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS All Charter TPS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
-0.0035 0.0272 -0.0088 -0.0074 -0.2795 -0.0053 
  
(0.0108) (0.0598) (0.0108) (0.0420) (0.2598) (0.0432) 
Charter enrollment share 
 
-0.1907 0.3116 -0.1558 -0.0812 -1.2627 -0.0308 
  
(0.0823)** (0.3225) (0.0829)* (0.2089) (2.9669) (0.2104) 
Charter teacher 
 
0.2360 
  
0.2336 
  
  
(0.0118)*** 
  
(0.0117)*** 
  Private enrollment share 
 
-0.0171 0.0013 -0.0061 0.0295 -1.0212 0.0405 
  
(0.0550) (0.2477) (0.0530) (0.2326) (1.7320) (0.2273) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0107 0.1249 0.0038 0.0139 0.1204 0.0064 
  
(0.0087) (0.0365)*** (0.0087) (0.0106) (0.0762) (0.0105) 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0051 0.0185 0.0041 0.0071 0.0154 0.0058 
  
(0.0066) (0.0284) (0.0065) (0.0079) (0.0661) (0.0078) 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0251 -0.0154 0.0268 0.0264 -0.0079 0.0276 
  
(0.0081)*** (0.0348) (0.0082)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0524) (0.0089)*** 
Constant 
 
0.1025 0.6164 0.0095 0.1081 -0.6897 0.0128 
  
(0.2532) (1.4295) (0.2461) (0.3370) (2.5120) (0.3252) 
        R2 
 
0.0276 0.0411 0.0067 
   Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 96.796 5,485 91,306 96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has 1-3 years of experience and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as independent 
variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.     
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Table 11:  State Certification Regressions  
 OLS  2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition -0.0038 -0.0861 0.0120 0.1207 0.2447 0.1442 
  
(0.0123) (0.0783) (0.0118) (0.0662)* (0.5261) (0.0624)** 
Charter enrollment share 
 
-0.1689 -0.5859 -0.2869 -0.7198 -6.2641 -0.7948 
  
(0.1134) (0.3967) (0.0982)*** (0.3083)** (5.6632) (0.2954)*** 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.2182 
  
-0.2168 
  
  
(0.0174)*** 
  
(0.0176)*** 
  Private enrollment share 
 
0.0400 0.1810 -0.0015 0.3033 1.3033 0.3311 
  
(0.0764) (0.3657) (0.0625) (0.4267) (4.1492) (0.3560) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
-0.0641 -0.2514 -0.0529 -0.0829 -0.3684 -0.0723 
  
(0.0092)*** (0.0484)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0164)*** (0.1750)** (0.0155)*** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
-0.0502 -0.2433 -0.0413 -0.0640 -0.3470 -0.0556 
  
(0.0083)*** (0.0405)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0128)*** (0.1484)** (0.0122)*** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
-0.0393 -0.1172 -0.0361 -0.0510 -0.1770 -0.0485 
  
(0.0087)*** (0.0421)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0130)*** (0.1216) (0.0129)*** 
Constant 
 
0.4921 -1.5124 0.7135 0.7349 -0.3986 1.0411 
  
(0.3010) (1.9701) (0.2741)*** (0.5711) (5.3839) (0.4994)** 
        R2 
 
0.0373 0.0907 0.0099 
   Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 96.796 5,485 91,306 96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher is regular state certification and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory 
variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 12:  Union Status Regressions  
  
OLS  2SLS 
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 0.0360 0.0734 0.0392 0.1056 1.2503 0.0459 
  
(0.0275) (0.0726) (0.0287) (0.1102) (0.6045)** (0.1173) 
Charter enrollment share 
 
-0.2248 -0.1595 -0.2531 -1.2139 -3.8594 -1.2787 
  
(0.2384) (0.5414) (0.2704) (0.6830)* (6.0670) (0.7227)* 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.5589 
  
-0.5554 
  
  
(0.0244)*** 
  
(0.0234)*** 
  Private enrollment share 
 
0.2014 0.8434 0.1348 0.7952 1.1087 0.8644 
  
(0.1348) (0.5787) (0.1448) (0.6864) (3.1063) (0.7430) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0368 -0.0048 0.0403 0.0089 -0.1640 0.0143 
  
(0.0202)* (0.0599) (0.0217)* (0.0295) (0.1567) (0.0317) 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0189 -0.0449 0.0234 -0.0027 -0.1653 0.0023 
  
(0.0166) (0.0448) (0.0177) (0.0226) (0.1225) (0.0243) 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0272 0.0308 0.0284 0.0146 -0.0996 0.0198 
  
(0.0188) (0.0548) (0.0201) (0.0233) (0.1046) (0.0247) 
Constant 
 
-2.8403 -2.3381 -2.8919 -2.2708 -0.6969 -2.2715 
  
(0.6854)*** (2.5598) (0.7299)*** (1.0035)** (4.4241) (1.0806)** 
        R2 
 
0.2155 0.1453 0.1563 
   Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 96.796 5,485 91,306 96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher belongs to a union or similar employees' association and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-
robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables 
are included as explanatory variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 13:  Math Degree Regressions  
  
  
OLS   2SLS 
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition  0.0014 0.0139 0.0012 
  
0.0342 0.0049 0.0359 
  
(0.0029) (0.0132) (0.0031) (0.0174)** (0.0595) (0.0181)** 
Charter enrollment share 
 
-0.0222 -0.0954 -0.0222 0.0849 -0.1936 0.0922 
  
(0.0222) (0.0789) (0.0236) (0.0934) (0.7442) (0.0955) 
Charter teacher 
 
0.0015 
  
0.0012 
  
  
(0.0023) 
  
(0.0024) 
  Private enrollment share 
 
-0.0257 0.0309 -0.0302 -0.0059 0.1405 -0.0159 
  
(0.0165) (0.0623) (0.0168) (0.0728) (0.2998) (0.0736) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0224 -0.0039 0.0238 0.0219 -0.0036 0.0234 
  
(0.0024)*** (0.0145) (0.0025)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0204) (0.0036)*** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0031 -0.0059 0.0036 0.0030 -0.0065 0.0036 
  
(0.0016)* (0.0094) (0.0017)*** (0.0026) (0.0153) (0.0027) 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0054 -0.0049 0.0059 0.0036 -0.0047 0.0040 
  
(0.0019)*** (0.0129) (0.0020)*** (0.0027) (0.0151) (0.0028) 
Constant 
 
0.0463 -0.0695 0.0461 0.1040 0.1154 0.0997 
  
(0.0888) (0.4216) (0.0896) (0.1318) (0.5245) (0.1334) 
        R2 
 
0.0037 0.0038 0.0041 
   Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 96.796 5,485 91,306 96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has a Bachelor's degree in math and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as 
explanatory variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 14:  Secondary School Regressions   
 
OLS   2SLS 
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition  -0.0358 -0.0648 -0.0328 
  
0.1913 0.5954 0.1969 
  
(0.0223) (0.0941) (0.0236) (0.1204) (0.4660) (0.1261) 
Charter enrollment share 
 
0.5610 -1.0349 0.5624 0.5178 3.5184 0.6102 
  
(0.1769)*** (0.4970)** (0.2038)*** (0.5601) (5.5970) (0.5743) 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.1299 
  
-0.1245 
  
  
(0.0193)*** 
  
(0.0196)*** 
  Private enrollment share 
 
0.2430 1.0474 0.1636 0.2225 0.5602 0.2337 
  
(0.1263)* (0.4011)*** (0.1262) (0.5447) (3.1147) (0.5441) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0974 -0.2757 0.1175 0.0783 -0.2285 0.1000 
  
(0.0177)*** (0.0658)*** (0.0183)*** (0.0248)*** (0.1390)* (0.0260)*** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0969 -0.1834 0.1106 0.0864 -0.1404 0.1008 
  
(0.0142)*** (0.0515)*** (0.0144)*** (0.0197)*** (0.1239) (0.0204)*** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.1013 -0.1272 0.1119 0.0847 -0.1333 0.0957 
  
(0.0163)*** (0.0592)** (0.0165)*** (0.0208)*** (0.0987) (0.0218)*** 
Constant 
 
1.4434 -0.1812 1.5568 1.6163 -0.3569 1.8517 
  
(0.5548)*** (2.3532)* (0.5580)*** (0.8249)** (4.3723) (0.8195) 
        R2 
 
0.0107 0.0841 0.0092 
   Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 96.796 5,485 91,306 96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher teaches grades 9-12 only and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory 
variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 15:  Previously Taught in Private Schools Regressions  
  
  
OLS 
  
2SLS 
All Charter TPS All Charter TPS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition  -0.0116 0.0251 -0.0168 
  
0.0215 -0.0111 0.0176 
  
(0.0069)* (0.0342) (0.0070)** (0.0266) (0.1471) (0.0268) 
Charter enrollment share  
 
0.0228 0.0208 0.0703 0.0431 0.7798 0.0095 
  
(0.0546) (0.1549) (0.0555) (0.1633) (1.7073) (0.1593) 
Charter teacher 
 
0.0480 
  
0.0474 
  
  
(0.0060)*** 
  
(0.0062)*** 
  Private enrollment share 
 
0.3125 0.0555 0.3366 -0.0009 0.2203 0.4388 
  
(0.0488)*** (0.1618) (0.0447)*** (0.0108) (0.7078) (0.1851) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.1025 0.0077 0.0011 0.0985 0.1977 0.0928 
  
(0.0058)*** (0.0101) (0.0021) (0.0074)*** (0.0370)*** (0.0072)*** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0971 0.1557 0.0941 0.0952 0.1660 0.0917 
  
(0.0047)*** (0.0195)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0059)*** (0.0319)*** (0.0055)*** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0921 0.1380 0.0899 0.0895 0.1437 0.0871 
  
(0.0048)*** (0.0217)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0248)*** (0.0053)*** 
Constant 
 
-0.1114 -1.5917 -0.0802 0.0022 -1.3345 0.0110 
  
(0.1893) (0.9936) (0.1859) (0.2686) (1.2412) (0.2486) 
        R2 
 
0.0293 0.0571 0,0268 
   Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 357 174 357 
N 96.796 5,485 91,306 96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has previously taught in a private school and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are 
included as explanatory variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
  
7 Conclusion 
 Many education reforms, such as charter schools and private school vouchers, are 
premised, in part, on the notion that increased competition in the market for elementary 
and secondary education incentivizes schools to become more efficient education 
providers when parents have some form of school choice.  A substantial body of 
literature has explored this notion, focusing mainly on the impact of competition on 
student achievement.  Relatively few studies however explore the importance of 
competition on the labor market outcomes of teachers.  The latter is important precisely 
because student achievement is largely a function of the things that past and present 
teachers do to promote student learning and growth.  It has thus been theorized that 
competition could create incentives for schools to attract and keep those teachers that 
promote efficiency and enhance schools’ profile with parents.57   
 This paper sheds light on this issue by estimating competition’s effect on the 
wages paid to teachers and on the characteristics, skills, and attributes of teachers.  We 
extend previous literature in three important ways.  First, while many studies focus on a 
specific form of competition, we estimate a more comprehensive effect of competition by 
estimating models that include measures of Tiebout competition, charter school 
competition, and private school competition simultaneously.  Second, we estimate 
competition’s effect on both charter teachers and TPS teacher separately.  This is 
important because policies that foster competition could have very different effects on 
teachers depending on the incentive structure of schools and the overall organizational 
goals of schools.  Lastly, our model allows us to examine differences in teacher pay and 
57 See Hoxby (2002). 
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teacher characteristics according to differences in school-setting by comparing pay and 
characteristics of teachers working in charter schools to TPS schools. 
 Findings presented in this paper indicate that competition-based reforms would 
likely benefit teachers through higher pay.  After controlling for potential omitted 
variable bias and endogeneity concerns, we find competition to be positively associated 
with teacher pay, particularly for TPS teachers.  Changing the amount of Tiebout 
competition from a single monopoly district to simulate perfect competition would raise a 
TPS teacher’s wages by approximately 24.5%.  This translates into a non-trivial amount 
of almost $11,000 per school-year in all school-related earnings for the average teacher.  
Results of charter competition yield similar conclusions, though the relationship between 
pay and charter competition is reduced at just under 4% more for the average teacher.58  
Finally, although always insignificant, point estimates are suggestive that competition-
based reforms could benefit charter teachers through higher pay as well, with the 
magnitude of the effects being slightly less than the wage effect for TPS teachers. 
 Findings presented in Chapter 6 tend to indicate that competition-based reforms 
would likely have little consensus impact on the type of teachers schools employ.  After 
controlling for potential endogeneity concerns, 2SLS estimates generally return few 
robust effects of competition on the teacher characteristics examined.  Of particular note 
however is that Tiebout competition appears to raise the likelihood of teachers with a 
Bachelor’s degree in math for TPS teachers; raise the likelihood of teachers having a 
Master’s degree for TPS teachers; and raise the likelihood of teachers having a regular 
state certification for TPS teachers.  Additionally, for TPS teachers, charter competition 
lowers the probability of teachers having a regular state certification and lowers the 
58 This is equivalent to a little under $2,000. 
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likelihood of teachers belonging to a union or similar employees association.  Lastly, 
competition appears to have little statistical relationship with the characteristics, skills, 
and attributes of charter teachers. 
 Other findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 highlight a number of important 
differences between teachers working in charter schools and TPS teachers that warrant 
mention.  Charter school teachers tend to receive significantly less compensation than do 
TPS teachers, and the characteristics, skills, and attributes also vary quite substantially 
between the public school types.  On average, charter teachers receive more than 7% less 
pay relative to their TPS counterpart.  Moreover, as described above, competition has 
little statistical influence on the wages paid to charter teachers, which dramatically 
contrasts with the effect of competition, both Tiebout and charter, for teachers working in 
TPSs.  Other important differences include charter teachers being much less likely to hold 
a Master’s degree, far more likely to be beginning-level teachers (1-3 years of 
experience), and considerably less likely to have a regular state certification or belong to 
a teachers’ union relative to TPS teachers.  Charter teachers are also more likely to have 
come from private schools, and they are less likely to be confined to teaching traditional 
secondary school grades (grades 9-12) than are teachers in TPSs.  Lastly, as noted above, 
neither school-choice reforms such as charter schools nor traditional forms of 
competition like Tiebout competition appear to make much of a difference in the 
characteristics, skills, and attributes of teachers in charter schools.  This contrast with 
TPS teachers seeing some change in credentials due to competition. 
 Finally, it has been long been noted in the education literature that a number of 
the measures of competition used in this very analysis are confounded by unobservable 
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influences, requiring an instrumental variables approach.  We introduce two new 
instruments to the mix in estimating the effect of charter competition, along with 
specifying proven instruments used in previous analyses to produce instrumental 
variables estimate of Tiebout competition and private school competition.  Specifically, 
we take the strength of charter law and time elapsed since the law first passed.  First-
stage results seemingly indicate that these two new instruments are highly correlated with 
charter competition and prove as credible instruments.  Furthermore, 2SLS results show 
the importance of correcting for unobserved influences in estimating charter 
competition’s effect on pay.  OLS produces negative and statistically insignificant 
estimates, whereas 2SLS results yield positive and statistically significant wage effects.  
Instrumenting for both Tiebout competition and private school competition likewise raise 
the magnitude and/or significance of estimates.  These findings underscore the notion that 
failing to correct for confounding influences will lead to false conclusions regarding the 
effects of competition, and highlight the importance of taking care to eliminate 
endogeneity concerns when studying competition. 
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Appendix Alternative Measures of Competition 
Appendix Table 1:  Means and Correlation Among Alternative Competition Measures  
     
        Panel A:  Summary Statistics 
 
Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
           
   Index of Tiebout competition  0.789 0.219 0.000 0.985   
   Herfindahl index based on total MSA enrollment 0.828 0.187 0.042 0.989 
     Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.551 0.427 0.000 0.992 
     Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.937 0.087 0.309 0.999 
     Charter enrollment share 
 
0.020 0.027 0.000 0.313 
     Private enrollment share 
 
0.091 0.043 0.002 0.314 
  
N = 96,796               
        
        Panel B:  Correlation Among the Measures of Competition 
      
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
   Index of Tiebout Competition (1) 1.00      
   Herfindahl index based on total MSA enrollment (2) 0.99 1.00     
   Charter enrollment Herfindahl (3) 0.32 0.34 1.00    
   Private enrollment Herfindahl (4) 0.48 0.52 0.50 1.00   
   Charter enrollment share (5) 0.13 0.16 0.58 0.16 1.00  
   Private  enrollment share (6) 0.21 0.29 0.12 0.48 -0.13 1.00 
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Appendix Alternative Wage Equation Results 
Appendix Table 2:  Wage Equation Regressions Using Herfindahl Index Based on District Shares of Total MSA Enrollment 
 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  All Charter TPS  All Charter TPS 
       (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A:  Regression Results 
   Herfindahl index 
 
0.0293 -0.0389 0.0308 
 
0.3054 0.2307 0.3094 
  
(0.0136)** (0.0549) (0.0143)** 
 
(0.1516)** (0.2311) (0.1513)** 
   Charter enrollment share 
 
0.1357 -0.1893 0.1975 
 
2.0288 0.7032 1.9596 
  
(0.1174) (0.1956) (0.1295) 
 
(0.4651)*** (1.9253) (0.4626)*** 
   Charter teacher 
 
-0.0693 
   
-0.0731 
  
  
(0.0071)*** 
   
(0.0078)*** 
     Private enrollment share 
 
-0.2006 0.3024 -0.2318 
 
0.2372 0.4188 0.2331 
  
(0.0811)*** (0.1474)** (0.0825)*** 
 
(0.5041) (0.9694) (0.5126) 
   Master's 
 
0.1158 0.0978 0.1160 
 
0.1156 0.0981 0.1158 
  
(0.0024)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0024)*** 
 
(0.0026)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0026)*** 
   Experience 
 
0.0298 0.0252 0.0300 
 
0.0298 0.0249 0.0300 
  
(0.0004)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0004)*** 
 
(0.0004)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0004)*** 
   Experience-squared 
 
-0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 
-0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
  
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
  Taught at private school 
 
-0.0327 -0.0654 -0.0290 
 
-0.0338 -0.0654 -0.0303 
  
(0.0021)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0022)*** 
 
(0.0024)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0024)*** 
  1-3 years experience 
 
0.0039 -0.0040 0.0022 
 
0.0042 -0.0042 0.0024 
  
(0.0028) (0.0090) (0.0029) 
 
(0.0030) (0.0090) (0.0031) 
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Appendix Table 2:  (Continued) 
         
   Teaches grades 9-12 
 
0.0247 0.0503 0.0240 
 
0.0240 0.0515 0.0233 
  
(0.0020)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0020)*** 
 
(0.0023)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0023)*** 
   Special education 
 
-0.0095 -0.0007 -0.0099 
 
-0.0102 0.0010 -0.0106 
  
(0.0018)*** (0.0118) (0.0018)*** 
 
(0.0020)*** (0.0121) (0.0020)*** 
   Certified 
 
0.0203 0.0370 0.0185 
 
0.0203 0.0375 0.0184 
  
(0.0028)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0028)*** 
 
(0.0029)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0028)*** 
   Female 
 
-0.0418 -0.0265 -0.0426 
 
-0.0419 -0.0264 -0.0427 
  
(0.0015)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0014)*** 
 
(0.0015)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0015)*** 
   Hispanic 
 
0.0001 -0.0156 0.0026 
 
-0.0001 -0.0140 0.0019 
  
(0.0035) (0.0107) (0.0035) 
 
(0.0046) (0.0112) (0.0045) 
   Black 
 
0.0051 0.0008 0.0063 
 
0.0062 0.0014 0.0073 
  
(0.0050) (0.0099) (0.0051) 
 
(0.0048) (0.0103) (0.0050) 
   Union 
 
0.0341 0.0660 0.0303 
 
0.0342 0.0647 0.0306 
  
(0.0025)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0027)*** 
 
(0.0031)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0034)*** 
   Constant 
 
6.5669 8.2004 6.4790 
 
7.7279 8.5646 7.6689 
    (0.3782)*** (0.9235)*** (0.3860)***   (0.7776)*** (1.5242)*** (0.7762)*** 
Panel B:  Regression Statistics 
   R2 
 
0.6743 0.5950 0.6747 
       Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96,796 5,485 91,306   96,796 5,485 91,306 
         Notes:  The dependent variable is the log of all school-related earnings.  Standard errors clustered by MSA are in parenthesis.  MSA 
characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as additional explanatory variables in all 
regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   
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Appendix Table 3:  Wage Equation Regressions Using Charter Enrollment Herfindahl and Private Enrollment Herfindahl 
 
  
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  All Charter TPS  All Charter TPS 
       (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A:  Regression Results 
           Index of Tiebout competition 
 
0.0428 -0.0374 0.0479 
 
0.2643 0.0560 0.2763 
  
(0.0110)*** (0.0426) (0.0116)*** 
 
(0.1084)** (0.1892) (0.1121)** 
   Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0388 -0.0656 0.0386 
 
0.1195 0.0063 0.1133 
  
(0.0083)*** (0.0271)** (0.0084)*** 
 
(0.0275)*** (0.1047) (0.0284)*** 
   Charter teacher 
 
-0.0729 
   
-0.0738 
  
  
(0.0067)*** 
   
(0.0068)*** 
     Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
-0.1596 -0.1357 -0.1646 
 
0.1163 -0.3382 0.1534 
  
(0.0338)*** (0.1099) (0.0346)*** 
 
(0.2109) (0.3826) (0.2220) 
   Master's 
 
0.1158 0.0979 0.1161 
 
0.1154 0.0981 0.1156 
  
(0.0024)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0024)*** 
 
(0.0027)*** (0.0075)*** (0.0027)*** 
   Experience 
 
0.0298 0.0251 0.0300 
 
0.0298 0.0251 0.0300 
  
(0.0004)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0004)*** 
 
(0.0005)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0004)*** 
   Experience-squared 
 
-0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 
-0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
  
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
   Taught at private school 
 
-0.0331 -0.0641 -0.0293 
 
-0.0337 -0.0649 -0.0301 
  
(0.0021)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0022)*** 
 
(0.0023)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0023)*** 
   1-3 years experience 
 
0.0041 -0.0038 0.0025 
 
0.0042 -0.0038 0.0025 
  
(0.0028) (0.0089) (0.0029) 
 
(0.0029) (0.0089) (0.0030) 
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Appendix Table 3:  (Continued) 
         
   Teaches grades 9-12 
 
0.0251 0.0514 0.0244 
 
0.0239 0.0528 0.0232 
  
(0.0020)*** (0.0085)*** (0.0020)*** 
 
(0.0022)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0022)*** 
   Special education 
 
-0.0097 0.0004 -0.0101 
 
-0.0100 0.0002 -0.0103 
  
(0.0018)*** (0.0117) (0.0018)*** 
 
(0.0020)*** (0.0120) (0.0020)*** 
   Certified 
 
0.0209 0.0369 0.0188 
 
0.0208 0.0376 0.0188 
  
(0.0028)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0029)*** 
 
(0.0027)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0028)*** 
   Female 
 
-0.0418 -0.0261 -0.0426 
 
-0.0420 -0.0256 -0.0428 
  
(0.0015)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0014)*** 
 
(0.0015)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0015)*** 
   Hispanic 
 
0.0003 -0.0145 0.0026 
 
-0.0002 -0.0118 0.0017 
  
(0.0035) (0.0108) (0.0035) 
 
(0.0036) (0.0115) (0.0037) 
   Black 
 
0.0050 0.0006 0.0062 
 
0.0061 0.0011 0.0073 
  
(0.0049) (0.0098) (0.0050) 
 
(0.0045) (0.0102) (0.0046) 
   Union 
 
0.0335 0.0654 0.0297 
 
0.0342 0.0635 0.0305 
  
(0.0025)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0026)*** 
 
(0.0027)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0029)*** 
   Constant 
 
7.0490 8.1308 6.9922 
 
7.1665 8.4868 7.0463 
    (0.3455)*** (0.9589)*** (0.3536)***   (0.6251)*** (1.2097)*** (0.6406)*** 
Panel B:  Regression Statistics 
   R2 
 
0.6758 0.5954 0.6762 
       Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96,796 5,485 91,306   96,796 5,485 91,306 
         Notes:  The dependent variable is the log of all school-related earnings.  Standard errors clustered by MSA are in parenthesis.  MSA 
characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as additional explanatory variables in all 
regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   
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Appendix Wage Equation Results Clustering by District  
Appendix Table 4:  Wage Equation Regressions, Standard Errors Clustered by District 
 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  All Charter TPS  All Charter TPS 
       (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A:  Regression Results 
   Index of Tiebout competition 
 
0.0346 -0.0498 0.0360 
 
0.2485 0.2383 0.2465 
  
(0.0145)** (0.0480) (0.0153)** 
 
(0.1219)** (0.1952) (0.1252)** 
   Charter enrollment share  
 
0.1165 -0.3341 0.1714 
 
1.4821 -1.2072 1.4510 
  
(0.0945) (0.1932)* (0.1024)* 
 
(0.4359)*** (1.6742) (0.4363)*** 
   Charter teacher 
 
-0.0837 
   
-0.0842 
  
  
(0.0071)*** 
   
(0.0084)*** 
     Private enrollment share 
 
-0.1593 0.3367 -0.1954 
 
0.3266 0.8614 0.2994 
  
(0.0673)** (0.1976)* (0.0711)*** 
 
(0.5775) (1.2087) (0.6043) 
   Master's 
 
0.1164 0.0860 0.1171 
 
0.1159 0.0861 0.1168 
  
(0.0021)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0021)*** 
 
(0.0029)*** (0.0090)*** (0.0028)*** 
   Experience 
 
0.0302 0.0288 0.0302 
 
0.0303 0.0285 0.0303 
  
(0.0004)*** (0.0023)*** (0.0004)*** 
 
(0.0004)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0004)*** 
   Experience-squared 
 
-0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 
-0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
 
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
  Taught at private school 
 
-0.0298 -0.0682 -0.0272 
 
-0.0309 -0.0675 -0.0284 
  
(0.0026)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0026)*** 
 
(0.0028)*** (0.0128)*** (0.0028)*** 
   1-3 years experience 
 
0.0074 0.0145 0.0057 
 
0.0075 0.0140 0.0058 
  
(0.0028)** (0.0110) (0.0029)* 
 
(0.0029)** (0.0114) (0.0030)* 
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Appendix Table 4:  (Continued) 
         
   Teaches grades 9-12 
 
0.0244 0.0420 0.0237 
 
0.0238 0.0444 0.0232 
  
(0.0023)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0023)*** 
 
(0.0024)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0024)*** 
   Special education 
 
-0.0103 0.0011 -0.0106 
 
-0.0109 0.0034 -0.0111 
  
(0.0022)*** (0.0126) (0.0023)*** 
 
(0.0024)*** (0.0126) (0.0024)*** 
   Certified 
 
0.0184 0.0242 0.0187 
 
0.0183 0.0249 0.0186 
  
(0.0031)*** (0.0090)*** (0.0033)*** 
 
(0.0032)*** (0.0099)** (0.0033)*** 
   Female 
 
-0.0419 -0.0243 -0.0427 
 
-0.0418 -0.0231 -0.0427 
  
(0.0016)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0016)*** 
 
(0.0016)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0017)*** 
   Hispanic 
 
0.0009 -0.0242 0.0037 
 
0.0006 -0.0243 0.0030 
  
(0.0053) (0.0131)* (0.0052) 
 
(0.0071) (0.0142)* (0.0066) 
   Black 
 
0.0086 0.0148 0.0082 
 
0.0097 0.0134 0.0093 
  
(0.0083) (0.0114) (0.0093) 
 
(0.0074) (0.0131) (0.0082) 
   Union 
 
0.0362 0.0782 0.0329 
 
0.0362 0.0769 0.0332 
  
(0.0031)*** (0.0115)*** (0.0033)*** 
 
(0.0033)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0034)*** 
   Constant 
 
6.4061 8.3985 6.2742 
 
7.4973 9.2000 7.3663 
    (0.4530)*** (1.0029)*** (0.4707)***   (0.8845)*** (1.6863)*** (0.9051)*** 
Panel B:  Regression Statistics 
   R2 
 
0.6420 0.5358 0.6452 
       Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   MSAs represented 
 
356 151 356 
 
356 151 356 
N   70,897 3,431 67,461   70,897 3,431 67,461 
         Notes:  The dependent variable is the log of all school-related earnings.  Standard errors clustered by district are in parenthesis.  MSA 
characteristics, census division indicators, and year indicator variables are included as additional explanatory variables in all regressions.  
Lose 1999-00 school-year due to missing LEAID for charter teachers.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   
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Appendix Alternative Teacher Characteristic Equation Results 
Appendix Table 5:  Master's Degree Regressions 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS 
  
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
0.0149 -0.0306 0.0198 
 
0.3056 -0.2586 0.3050 
  
(0.0202) (0.0639) (0.0210) 
 
(0.1441)** (0.5006) (0.1463)** 
Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0069 -0.0823 0.0098 
 
-0.0235 -0.7249 -0.0261 
  
(0.0129) (0.0493)* (0.0132) 
 
(0.0798) (0.3805)* (0.0808) 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.1699 
   
0.1790 
  
  
(0.0122)*** 
   
(0.1266) 
  Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
-0.0165 0.0916 -0.0312 
 
0.2586 0.3679 0.2758 
  
(0.0492) (0.2368) (0.0501) 
 
(0.2665) (0.6091) (0.2720) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
-0.0277 -0.2058 -0.0170 
 
-0.0604 -0.2578 -0.0517 
  
(0.0144)* (0.0385)*** (0.0149) 
 
(0.0273)** (0.0756)*** (0.0284)* 
Year = 2003-04 
 
-0.0324 -0.1378 -0.0258 
 
-0.0541 -0.1775 -0.0489 
  
(0.0119)*** (0.0313)*** (0.0123)** 
 
(0.0194)*** (0.0546)*** (0.0202)** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
-0.0022 -0.1244 0.0040 
 
-0.0267 -0.1358 -0.0212 
  
(0.0140) (0.0410)*** (0.0145) 
 
(0.0219) (0.0646)** (0.0228) 
Constant 
 
-1.1834 0.5909 -1.2806 
 
-1.3613 0.9128 -1.4985 
  
(0.6894)* (1.5607) (0.7128)* 
 
(0.7817)* (2.9173) (0.7986)* 
         R2 
 
0.0458 0.0418 0.0418 
    Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96.796 5,485 91,306   96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has a Master's degree and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  MSA 
characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory variables in all regressions.  *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Appendix Table 6:  Beginning Teacher Regressions (1-3 Years of Experience) 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
-0.0092 0.0285 -0.0138 
 
0.0004 -0.1857 -0.0087 
  
(0.0105) (0.0608) (0.0108) 
 
(0.0530) (0.2706) (0.0545) 
Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0034 0.0792 -0.0008 
 
0.0014 -0.0158 0.0030 
  
(0.0057) (0.0475)* (0.0056) 
 
(0.0154) (0.1606) (0.0157) 
Charter teacher 
 
0.2330 
   
0.2328 
  
  
(0.0118)*** 
   
(0.0119)*** 
  Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0182 -0.2949 0.0283 
 
0.0322 0.1189 -0.0093 
  
(0.0246) (0.2105) (0.0245) 
 
(0.1072) (0.5102) (0.1088) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0152 0.1167 0.0067 
 
0.0138 0.1183 0.0085 
  
(0.0090)* (0.0336)*** (0.0090) 
 
(0.0127) (0.0579)** (0.0129) 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0080 0.0145 0.0061 
 
0.0070 0.0131 0.0073 
  
(0.0068) (0.0272) (0.0067) 
 
(0.0094) (0.0478) (0.0093) 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0262 -0.0261 0.0279 
 
0.0257 -0.0093 0.0282 
  
(0.0085)*** (0.0335) (0.0085)*** 
 
(0.0100)*** (0.0440) (0.0101)*** 
Constant 
 
0.1064 1.3077 -0.0250 
 
0.0451 0.2430 0.0000 
  
(0.2480) (1.3487) (0.2424) 
 
(0.3100) (1.8425) (0.3088) 
         R2 
 
0.0275 .0419 0.0067 
    Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96.796 5,485 91,306   96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has 1-3 years of experience and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory variables in all regressions.  
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Appendix Table 7:  State Certification Regressions 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
-0.0057 -0.0915 0.0079 
 
0.0851 0.1502 0.1171 
  
(0.0125) (0.0795) (0.0119) 
 
(0.0779) (0.4718) (0.0733) 
Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
-0.0273 -0.1292 -0.0253 
 
-0.0567 -0.4915 -0.0585 
  
(0.0077)*** (0.0614)** (0.0067)*** 
 
(0.0220)*** (0.2931)* (0.0205)*** 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.2162 
   
-0.2153 
  
  
(0.0175)*** 
   
(0.0184)*** 
  Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
-0.0130 0.3968 -0.0278 
 
-0.0781 0.0469 -0.0382 
  
(0.0315) (0.2865) (0.0282) 
 
(0.1821) (1.1111) (0.1552) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
-0.0620 -0.2350 -0.0485 
 
-0.0696 -0.3075 -0.0602 
  
(0.0093)*** (0.0471)*** (0.0083)*** 
 
(0.0185)*** (0.1043)*** (0.0172)*** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
-0.0471 -0.2336 -0.0366 
 
-0.0515 -0.2841 -0.0438 
  
(0.0082)*** (0.0391)*** (0.0075)*** 
 
(0.0145)*** (0.0845)*** (0.0136)*** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
-0.0349 -0.0999 -0.0312 
 
-0.0408 -0.1241 -0.0393 
  
(0.0087)*** (0.0399)** (0.0081)*** 
 
(0.0128)*** (0.0613)** (0.0129)*** 
Constant 
 
0.3624 -2.6503 0.6332 
 
0.4797 -2.4574 0.7058 
  
(0.2904) (1.9932) (0.2757)** 
 
(0.4597) (3.8454) (0.4202)* 
         R2 
 
0.0367 0.0101 0.0922 
    Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96.796 5,485 91,306   96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has regular state certification and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory variables in 
all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Appendix Table 8:  Union Status Regressions 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
0.0266 0.0718 0.0305 
 
0.1392 0.9701 0.0976 
  
(0.0284) (0.0713) (0.0300) 
 
(0.1489) (0.6099) (0.1603) 
Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0034 -0.1718 0.0048 
 
-0.0916 -0.2897 -0.0985 
  
(0.0153) (0.1063) (0.0158) 
 
(0.0495)* (0.3938) (0.0525)* 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.5624 
   
-0.5573 
  
  
(0.0239)*** 
   
(0.0234)*** 
  Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
-0.0314 0.0964 -0.0448 
 
0.2855 -0.6783 0.3767 
  
(0.0678) (0.3347) (0.0690) 
 
(0.3019) (1.4132) (0.3337) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0451 -0.0149 0.0489 
 
0.0110 -0.0797 0.0119 
  
(0.0202)** (0.0570) (0.0220)** 
 
(0.0356) (0.1435) (0.0391) 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0258 -0.0489 0.0302 
 
0.0029 -0.0859 0.0048 
  
(0.0168) (0.0430) (0.0180)* 
 
(0.0273) (0.1093) (0.0298) 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0298 0.0297 0.0310 
 
0.0183 -0.0452 0.0210 
  
(0.0188) (0.0553) (0.0202) 
 
(0.0269) (0.0855) (0.0289) 
Constant 
 
-2.9768 -3.7418 -2.9568 
 
-3.5952 -1.0876 -3.8034 
  
(0.6756)*** (2.7844) (0.7119)*** 
 
(0.8954)*** (5.6584) (0.9342)*** 
         R2 
 
0.2153 0.1463 0.1561 
    Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96.796 5,485 91,306   96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher belongs to a union or similar employees' association and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as 
explanatory variables in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.  
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Appendix Table 9:  Math Degree Regressions   
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
 
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
0.0013 0.0126 0.0010 
 
0.0286 -0.0094 0.0312 
  
(0.0029) (0.0127) (0.0030) 
 
(0.0173)* (0.0741) (0.0181)* 
Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0001 -0.0207 0.0011 
 
0.0075 -0.0045 0.0082 
  
(0.0019) (0.0128) (0.0020) 
 
(0.0058) (0.0409) (0.0059) 
Charter teacher 
 
0.0012 
   
0.0012 
  
  
(0.0023) 
   
(0.0024) 
  Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0008 -0.0378 0.0018 
 
-0.0252 -0.0345 -0.0235 
  
(0.0083) (0.0542) (0.0084) 
 
(0.0372) (0.1378) (0.0384) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0227 -0.0001 0.0241 
 
0.0229 0.0028 0.0241 
  
(0.0024)*** (0.0132) (0.0024)*** 
 
(0.0044)*** (0.0191) (0.0045)*** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0032 -0.0029 0.0036 
 
0.0036 -0.0007 0.0039 
  
(0.0016)* (0.0087) (0.0017)** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0134) (0.0032) 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0055 -0.0026 0.0058 
 
0.0038 -0.0016 0.0041 
  
(0.0019)*** (0.0122) (0.0020)*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0149) (0.0031) 
Constant 
 
0.0682 -0.0269 0.0742 
 
0.1586 0.0170 0.1626 
  
(0.0887) (0.4370) (0.0900) 
 
(0.1169) (0.4608) (0.1168) 
         R2 
 
0.0037 0.0041 0.0040 
    Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.2043 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96.796 5,485 91,306   96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has a Bachelor's degree in math and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory variables in 
all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Appendix Table 10:  Secondary School Teacher Regressions 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
 
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
-0.0306 -0.0891 -0.0267 
 
0.2369 0.6932 0.2439 
  
(0.0225) (0.0959) (0.0236) 
 
(0.1597) (0.5443) (0.1646) 
Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
-0.0072 -0.0932 0.0030 
 
0.0290 0.2031 0.0394 
  
(0.0141) (0.0792) (0.0145) 
 
(0.0427) (0.3383) (0.0439) 
Charter teacher 
 
-0.1223 
   
-0.1265 
  
  
(0.0193)*** 
   
(0.0201)*** 
  Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.1645 -0.1283 0.1594 
 
0.2181 0.3750 0.2232 
  
(0.0640)*** (0.4314) (0.0640)** 
 
(0.3361) (1.2548) (0.3430) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.0821 -0.2373 0.1034 
 
0.0642 -0.2770 0.0856 
  
(0.0174)*** (0.0650)*** (0.0181)*** 
 
(0.0344)* (0.1266)** (0.0360)** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0867 -0.1530 0.1003 
 
0.0745 -0.1857 0.0884 
  
(0.0141)*** (0.0509)*** (0.0145)*** 
 
(0.0266)*** (0.1005)* (0.0278)*** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0967 -0.1104 0.1064 
 
0.0749 -0.1656 0.0850 
  
(0.0162)*** (0.0622)* (0.0166)*** 
 
(0.0255)*** (0.0849)* (0.0269)*** 
Constant 
 
1.0321 -1.0170 1.2817 
 
1.0876 -1.4074 1.3260 
  
(0.5359)* (2.4418) (0.5408)** 
 
(0.8300) (4.0154) (0.8313) 
         R2 
 
0.0103 0.0089 0.0781 
    Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96.796 5,485 91,306   96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher teaches grades 9-12 only and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory variables in all regressions.  
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Appendix Table 11:  Previously Taught in Private Schools Regressions 
  
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
 
All Charter TPS 
 
All Charter TPS 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Index of Tiebout competition 
 
-0.0207 0.0232 -0.0250 
 
0.0197 0.0345 0.0126 
  
(0.0071)*** (0.0343) (0.0072)*** 
 
(0.0251) (0.1564) (0.0252) 
Charter enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0068 0.0539 0.0038 
 
0.0040 0.0483 0.0007 
  
(0.0043) (0.0241)** (0.0043) 
 
(0.0110) (0.1002) (0.0107) 
Charter teacher 
 
0.0467 
   
0.0466 
  
  
(0.0058)*** 
   
(0.0059)*** 
  Private enrollment Herfindahl 
 
0.0776 0.1520 0.0778 
 
0.0635 0.1716 0.0580 
  
(0.0184)*** (0.1394) (0.0184)*** 
 
(0.0500) (0.1680) (0.0508) 
Year = 1999-00 
 
0.1040 0.1852 0.0984 
 
0.1009 0.1834 0.0958 
  
(0.0058)*** (0.0219)*** (0.0058)*** 
 
(0.0074)*** 0.02576)*** (0.0073)*** 
Year = 2003-04 
 
0.0991 0.1544 0.0958 
 
0.0973 0.1529 0.0943 
  
(0.0046)*** (0.0189)*** (0.0046)*** 
 
(0.0052)*** (0.0215)*** (0.0052)*** 
Year = 2007-08 
 
0.0918 0.1369 0.0898 
 
0.0898 0.1345 0.0880 
  
(0.0048)*** (0.0210)*** (0.0049)*** 
 
(0.0052)*** (0.0232)*** (0.0053)*** 
Constant 
 
-0.4480 -1.9306 -0.4414 
 
-0.5071 -1.8186 -0.5038 
  
(0.2109)*** (1.0701)* (0.2117)** 
 
(0.2274)** (1.0005)* (0.2261)** 
         R2 
 
0.0286 0.0580 0.0259 
    Probability > F 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MSAs represented 
 
357 174 357 
 
357 174 357 
N   96.796 5,485 91,306   96.796 5,485 91,306 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 if teacher has previously taught in a private school and 0 otherwise.  Cluster-robust standard errors are 
in parenthesis.  MSA characteristics, census division indicator variables, and year indicator variables are included as explanatory variables 
in all regressions.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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